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N THE present issue of the Fo?·um the reader
will find a number of articles which concern
either directly or indirectly the views of Professor Van Til of Westminster Seminary. Four of
them represent a symposium on Dr. Daane's book,
A THEOLOGY OF GRACE. Inasmuch as the Forum
is a journal devoted to the application of Reformed
principles to religious, cultural and other fields, the
editorial committee regrets its becoming top-heavy
with discussions on a relatively minor parochial
issue. However, in view of the series of criticisms
of Van Til which appeared on these pages during
the Autumn of 1953, and in view of the rather cursory and admittedly inexpert notices given to A
THEOLOGY OF GRACE elsewhere, the committee decided to give both Daane and the defenders of Van
Til a hearing. Incidentally, with this issue and,
possibly, a few articles widely scattered among future issues the committee hopes to be done for a
while with the subject of Van Til.
Daane's book concerns the philosophical principles
underlying Van Til's view of the doctrine of common
grace, the thesis being that these principles involve
a virtual denial of that doctrine. The criticisms appearing in the Forum during the Autumn of 1953
concerned primarily the intellectual respectability
of the philosophical argument involved in Van Til's
apologetics, touching only incidentally upon the subject of common grace. There was, therefore, no
attempt to call in question the soundness of Van Til's
personal theological beliefs, but only to point out
that his philosophical justification of those beliefs
left much to be desired.1
In fact, the criticisms were in reality a statement
of disappointment by men of the Reformed faith
trained in the field of philosophy, a statement in
which they deplored the fact that his defence of
Christian Theism appeared to be a rather inferior
performance. They specifically pointed out that
as the result of an inaccurate use of the language of
philosophy and a failure to express himself in clear
and unambiguous English, Van Til's writings were
characterized by confused expression to such an
extent that any philosophically trained person trying to get some idea of the specific content of Christian Theism, upon reading what Van Til wi·ites
in defence of it, could easily come away with the
impression that it must be a form of pantheism.
That some of these critics exhibited impatience

I

t See the Calvin Forum, Vol. XIX, No. 1-2 (Aug.-Sept.,
1958).
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and occasionally employed sharp language should
be judged in the light of the fact that a man of Reformed convictions on the philosophy staff of a state
university is not in an enviable position. He is called
upon almost daily-frequently under quite embarrassing circumstances-to give an answer "to every
man that asketh you a reason of the hope that is in
you." Should he at an unguarded moment avail
himself of Van Til's arguments, their futility would
be pointed out to him almost at once. If in addition
he should be told - and shown - that the job of
Christian apologetics had been done considerably
better by Anglicans and Catholics (Fairbairn, Taylor, De Burgh and others), he can hardly be expected, if he is under fifty, to take this with the nonchalance of an experienced and probably tired saint
of seventy-five. After all, a bad argument for the
truth can do more damage than a good argument
against it. Apologetics is in part for the silencing of
the scornfuli and Van Til's way of doing this is
evidently not the way to do it.
Does Van Til merit the confidence of the Church'?
We leave that to our ministers and theologians,
meanwhile observing that although his soundness
may be a question to be put to the test of Scripture,
A.1 ... - .!_.,.J.. - 11- - L,..,r,;1 ._,.. ..... -·---~-1....:1:~.-.
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in apologetics is a question to be put to the test of
philosophy as well as Scripture. Van Til's personal

beliefs may be quite in order, but he evidently has
great difficulty making this clear in the language of
philosophy. And that, incidentally, may account
for the fact. that his critics so frequently "misunderstand" him. In other words, by reason of his in.accurate use of the language of philosophy and his
failure to express himself in unambiguous English,
he may virtua11y have caricatnrecl his own position
which - let us assume for argument's sake - may
be wholly Reformed.
A postscript. The Calvin Forum is a forum; and
opinions expressed in the articles contained in this
and other issues are not necessarily those of the
editorial committee, to say nothing of the Forum
Board. As for the opinions expressed in the editorials
-they are the sole responsibility of the staff member
expressing them.
C.D.B.

The Daane Reviews: II.
That Calvinists differ at times in their theolog1cal
constructions is a truism that needs no documentation. That in itself is not regrettable. On the con-

trary, it is salutary and good. It indicates a living
church. It indicates a church that manifests concern
about constantly rethinking its basic position. Open
discussion of differences, if conducted on the high
level that befits the Calvinist, can be fruitful and
beneficial. Furthermore, it may signalize progress.
Only when our cherished views are tested anew in
the crucible of the Word of God can we come to
greater clarity and precision with respect to them.
So we construe the debate between Dr. C. Van Til
and Dr. J as. Daane on the subject of common grace
and its concomitant, the philosophy of history. This
is no personal quarrel between the contestants -,
they are fellowsoldiers in the army of the Lord.
Nor is this a squabble between Westminster and Calvin or between the Orthodox Presbyterian and Christian Reformed Churches. We are allies in a common
cause. We stand shoulder to shoulder in our defense
and propagation of the Reformed faith. But we are
seeking clearer and more adequate formulation of
these truths imbedded in the Word of God. That
is the avowed aim of the chief figures in this discussion. Although both of them argue their respective positions vigorously, no one of them claims
finality for his position. Both are ready to admit
that there may be flaws or loopholes in th eir reasoning or argumentation. To make that admission is
the mark of a humble Christian scholar who knows

that even though he is regenerate, the beclouding
vestige of sin is still with him and will be with him
to his dying day. Hence we need mutual instruction.
We must learn from one another. In these controversial writings we design to assist one another in our
comprehension and explication of the Reformed
faith. And in order that the study which has been
projected into the limelight may be carried forward
we have sought the contributions of other minds.
We have arranged a symposium on Daane's A Tm:oLOGY OF GRACE. Invitations to participate were extended to Prof. L. Berkhof of Grand Rapids, Dr.
Edw. Carnell of Fuller Theological Seminary, Dr.
Alex. De Jong of Grand Rapids, Rev. Edw. Herrema
of Grand Rapids, Dr. Carl Henry of Fuller Seminary,
Dr. Balmer Kelly of Union Theological Seminary,
Richmond, Virginia, Pres. R. B. Kuiper of Calvin
Seminary, Rev. Raymond Opperwal of Racine, Wisconsin, Rev. L. Verduin of Ann Arbor, Michigan and
Dr. William Young, currently studying in Oxford,
England. Pressure of duty and other commitments
kept the number of contributors relatively low. We
are pleased to present, however, the reactions of the
Messrs. Herrema, Opperwal, Verduin and Young,
who have kindly consented to serve the Reformed
community with their reflections.
John H. Bratt,
(Book Editor of The0legical Works)

Daane's A Theology of Grace*
============~ASyrnposiu:m=:====================================~
Raymond Opperwall

IS book deserves a serious reading by the cal remnants, he has himself enmeshed the doctrine
readers of the Calvin Forum. It is a direct of common grace in a compound of Hegelian ration~
analysis and evaluation of Dr. C. Van Til's alism and modern existentialism. (2) That as a review of common grace and the philosophkal sult of this philosophical structure Van Til's alleged
structure underlying that view. While other writers refinement of the Three Points of 1924 is in fact a
have addressed themselves to the views of Dr. Van repudiation of the Three Points.
Til, this is the first book to appear that is devoted
Daane begins his substantiation by pointing out
exclusively to those views. For some years there
has been a real need for competent assessment of the that Van Til defines the whole problem of common
philosophical framework of Dr. Van Til's position, grace differently than have the traditional Reformed
particularly because some who have accepted his theologians. For Van Til the problem has been reframework have been pressing their criticism of the duced to a problem of commonality. The older Remore traditional position on common grace in a way formed theologians regarded the problem as one of
that cannot be ignored. This, then, should be a the relation between sin and grace. For Van Til it
relevant book, since it addresses itself to a problem is rather "the question of what entities who will one
disturbing to everyone alive to the situation.
day be wholly separate have in common in time."
(p. 24) Unlike Kuyper and others, Van Til thereI
fore makes no distinction between sinless and sinful
The fundamental thesis of the book may be rather time. as far as this problem is concerned. For Kuysimply summarized. As Daane tells us in the pre.face per "common was a question of grace and grace was
he is concerned that we see two things: (1) That a question of sinful time." (p. 24) This is also true
while Van Til has attempted to deliver the common- of the formulations of 1924 (seep. 34). But for Van
grace views of others from non-Christian philosophi- Til, both before and after the fall there is the one
problem of accounting for commonality in history
.. Gro.11rl Rapids: Wm. R. Ber<lmans; 1964.
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when he does not find it in God's decree of election
and reprobation.
There is a reason, Daane informs us, for this new
definition of the problem. It is to be fow1d in the
.fact that Van Til takes as his point of departure the
abstract entities of election and reprobation. Beginning abstractly with two entities which by dcfmition have nothing in common, Van Til sees the
"problem" as one of explaining what two such entities can have jn common in time.
This starting point, Daane goes on, is the same as
Herman Hoeksema's. But Hoeksema, proceeding
from this abstract starting point, arrives with simple
consistency at a denial of common grace. Hoeksema's
logic is excellent. Two things which by definition
have nothing in common simply do not have grace
in common. Hocksema's error is his starting point.
He has reduced c1ection and reprobation to abstractions, whereas actually election and reprobation do
not exist except as qualities that adhere to persons.
Furthermore, rcpersons defined exclusively in terms
of election and reprobation do not exist, either in
the mind of God or in the temporal world." (p. 27)
Thus, the un-Scriptural abstractness of Hoeksema's
point of departure predetermines his denial of common grace.
But now Van Til starts where Hoeksema starts
rather than where the framework of the 1924 formulations begins. Why is it that Van Til does not
then arrive at IIoeksema's conclusion? The reason,
says Daane, is that Van Til thinks in existential
categories while IIoeksema does not. If Van Til
would lay aside his existential categories he would
come out just where Hoeksema does. If Hoekserri_a;
on the other hand, would accept Van Til's existential
categories he would come out just where Van Til
docs. (See pp. 59-60)
II
Van Til's problem of common grace then becomes
a "problem" of how to avoid Hoeksema's conclusions
after one has accepted his starting point. The key
to answering this wrongly-defined problem of common grace Van Til would provide by throwing history into a existential framework. The "problem"
c.:un be resolved by seeing history as an existential
process, i.e., a process in which elect and reprobate
arc gradually coming to existence, becoming selfconsciously themselves, or achieving more fully what
they already are in principle. (see p. 44)
This involves regarding history as a p1·ocess of
particularization. At one end of the process is the
beginning of history when elect and reprobate have
everything in common. At the other end of the process is the conclusion of history when elect and reprobate have nothing in common. Moving between
these two poles are the historical elect and reprobate.
They are gradually emerging from the commonness
of the beginning and moving toward the separation
T im
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at the end. '!'hey are like one another to the extent
that they have not yet become self-consciously
''themselves," but insofar as they are "themselves"
they already have nothing in common.
Commonness in God's grace must then be related
to the degree to which men are not yet themselves.
"When the reprobate is 10% reprobate he is 10%
of what he will be ultimately. When he is 10% reprobate, 10% of his not-yet-existence has turned into
real existence. Toward this 10% reprobate God
has only wrath; because he is 10% real, 10% of common grace is already past for him. Only toward the
90 % does God extend his common grace, i.e., common grace extends to the 90% non-existence which
is not-yet. 11 (p. 50)
Behind Van Til's existential tension of history
Daane finds a use of the ontological trinity as Van
TiPs most basic principle of interpretation. For Van
Til the problem of commonality vs. particularity in
history is but one aspect of the great problem of the
one and the many. For Van Til the key to every
form of this problem is to be found in the ontological
trinity, our "Concrete Universal," in whom one-ness
and many-ness are equally ultimate. Regarding the
one-many problem as the basic problem of interpretation Van Til regards the one-many aspect of the
Trinity as the Christian's most basic principle of interpretation.
Daane, however, regards this use of the Trinity as
more Hegelian than Biblical. Hegel also claimed the
Trinity as his concrete universal. Both Hegel and
Van Til have abstracted the one-many aspect of
God's nature and elevated it at the expense of God's
virtues revealed in Christ. Daane believes that we
must recognize the one-many aspect of God's nature,
but we must reckon with the whole of God's nature.
God's revealed nature cannot be reduced to a biblical
statement of the right interrelationship of the one
and the many. Daane asks: "Does the Bible present
the one-many principle as the highest principle of
interpretation'? .... as the key to the interpretation
of every problem, including sin?" (p. 103)
Non-Christian philosophers, Daane goes on, have
often presented the one-many problem as though it
were the world's one great problem. But rcchristian
theologians must not allow non-Christian thinkers
to formulate their problems for them. . .Christian
thinkers must remember that the form of the problem determines the form 0£ the solution." (p. 104)
For the Christian the one-many problem is
not the basic problem. But Van Til has accepted a non-Christian definition of the problem of
history and as a result has "gone off on a philosopher's holiday." (p. 105)
The serious thing about this compound of "Hegelian rationalism" and "existential dialecticism,11 says
Daane, is that it overthrows the Biblical views of the
nature of God, of grace, and of time. The abstract
use of election and reprobation as if they were equal173

ly ultimate involves making God's wrath as definitive
of God's nature as his love. (p. 71) God then becomes not a God who has no pleasure in the death of
the wicked and who would have all men to be saved,
but a God who is as much interested in the damnation of the reprobate as He is in the salvation of the
elect. History, too, is not "distinctively and decisively qualified by grace so that its continuance may be
regarded as a result of grace and its distinctive purpose that of redemption. . .. History is [rather]
equally much geared toward election and reprobation, toward heaven and hell.'' However, says Daane,
"According to Gen. 3: 15 the primal issue of history
is redemption, the crushing of evil, and the victory
of the good." (p. 141)

III
The Three Points of 1924 also do not escape mutilation. The fact that Van Til says "No" to Hoeksema
does not mean that Van Til says "Yes" to 1924.
Daane is convinced that Van Til cannot and does not
accept the Three Points as they were intended by
the 1924 Synod. While Van Til acknowledges a common grace to men "in general" Van Til plainly denies
that common grace is extended to men as reprobate.
This is due to the fact that Van Til relates the "in
general'' only to non-existence or not-yet-ness. Van
Til thus believes that in so far as a man is reprobate
God has only wrath for him. But Synod of 1924 in
Point I "declares that there is a 'favorable attitude
of God toward mankind in general, and not alone totoward the elect. . .' " Furthermore, "it ought not to
escape notice [that! Synod's phrase 'mankind in
generali means precisely the reprobate as distin_auished from the elect." (p. 46) rrtalics Daane'sl
Similar things happen to points two and three or
1924. In Van Til's framework they cannot mean
what the 1924 Synod meant by them.
In Van Til's theology strange things also happen
to the general gospel offer which 1924 regarded as
an evidence of favor toward the reprobate. Van Til
attacks the 1924 teaching on the general offer as it
appears in Hepp's writings. (p. 53 ff.) Van Til, Daane
goes on 1 "cannot on his basis allow what Hepp allows
- and what 1924 allows - the extension of a wellmeant offer of salvation, expressive of God's will
to save, to sinners as real sinners, to reprobate as
real reprobate." (p. 56) Instead, to Van Til the
general offer has for its purpose the producing of
two kinds of reactions in men. It is an instrument
by which two kinds of men are to be brought to selfconsciousness and thus the historical process advanced. But then, says Daane, the gospel becomes
equally much bad news as good news, equally much
a savor of death unto death as a savor of life unto
life. Christ then came into the world to condemn
the world to the same extent that He came to save.
But this is a distortion of the Biblical well-meant
offer and a profound distortion of the gospel itself.
''Van Til's view of common grace, like Hoeksema's
_.
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denial of common grace, involves much more than
a mere difference of opinion concerning a separate
isolated doctrine. What is at stake is the very essence of the gospel of grace and the very nature of
God himself." (p. 73)
IV
But are all these charges of Daane's correct? To
what extent is Van Til subject to the criticisms of
the book? This is a question which needs much sane
discussion with open minds and perhaps some tenta ti vity of judgment for a time. My own feeling is
that there is enough truth in this book to make Van
Til extremely uncomfortable. While there are
aspects of Daane's criticism which seem to me to go
too far, it seems difficult to deny the force of his
main thesis. I believe that those who have read with
understanding both Van Til and Daane will not deny
that Van Til has f1•amed the problem of common
grnce as Daane indicates and has sought to solve his
p1·oblem with the use of existential categories. This
much of Daane's analysis is too well documented by
Van Til's own words - words which when checked
in their context in Van Til make no sense if interpreted otherwise.
There are places where Daane seems to forget the
larger context in which Van Til is operating, or the
limitations which this places upon his existential
categories (e.g., p. 44, mid-page). Van Til at least
desires to limit the use of these categories to the
ethical and epistemological realm, and this within
the framework of a Christian metaphysics built on
the Creator-creature relationship. In many places
Daal1e also goes far beyond Van Til's intent in the
application of these principles. All this, no doubt.
is done in the interest of showing the unsuitability
of these principles. However, it seems as though
Daane might have distinguished more sharply between what Van Til intends to say and what his
theology entitles him to say. Ironically, Van Til
himself is often rightly criticized for failure to make
this same distinction in his treatment of others.
However, even when one carefully limits the use
of these existential categories to the area in which
Van Til obviously intends them, Daane's basic criticism still seems to hold. These philosophical categories as Van Til uses them are still uncongenial to
the expression of Scriptural truth and result in a
distortion of the Three Points of 1924 and of the
whole gospel.
The correctness of Daane's basic criticism is underscored by the way his analysis explains some of
the formerly puzzling things about Van Til's thought.
lJ'or example, Van Til insists that he believes in commonness (for the time being), but nevertheless he
also insists upon an absolutistic" black and white"
apologetics - not at the end of history but here and
now. How can these two things be reconciled?
Daane's analysis makes the answer clear. If history
is an existentfal process of becoming it is only at the
THE
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end of history that men will be themselves. Hence,
for Van Til a consistent apologetics must wipe away
the misleading appearances and illusions of history,
unmasking a man as he is in "himself." Such a view
of history can produce only a black and white apologetics, for commonness is there only as umeality
or not-yet-ness.
'!'he treatment of philosophical categories probably makes this book difficult reading for those unfamiliar with the terminology. For this, of course,
Daane need not apologize. The categories are Van
Til's, not Daane's, and Van Til's theology cannot be
analyzed without the unthreading of these principles.
Nevertheless, some may note the philosophical terminology and easily assume that the essential criticism
of the book is philosophical. This is not true. As the
title of the book indicates, it is Van Til's theology that
Daane challenges. The question is whether Van Til's
theology is faithful to Scripture. As Daane puts it:
"What is at stake is the very essence of the gospel
of grace and the very nature of God himself." (p. 73)

•

Edward Heerema

T WAS to be expected that voices would be
raised to challenge the thinking of Dr. C. Van Til.
That is commonly the case when a man takes a
position on moot questions and expounds it forthrightly over a period of time. And every student of
Van Til welcomes such challenges as an aid to the
clarification of his own thinking. Any sincere piece
of writing, polemical and otherwise, that honors the
accepted canons of responsible discussion and composition, is helpful to this end and is therefore to be
welcomed.
This former pupil of Van Til finds it most difficult
to welcome the book under review in that spirit.
The most obvious reason for this difficulty lies in the
fact that the book charges Van Til with just about
everything that he has vigorously challenged and
criticized. Grounding himself on the ontological
Trinity as revealed in Scripture, Van Til has persistently attacked (also in his Common Grace) abstraction in the formulation of our conceptions
Throughout his book Daane charges Van TH with
the most arrant abstractionism.

I

I
"Van Til's thought," we are told "is shot through
with a sheer unbiblical individualism" (p. 109). And
here is the ultra-ultra judgment: "His fundamental
presuppositions lie embedded in the rational dialectical tra di ti on of philosophic idealism. It has been
modified by existentialism. His basic presuppositions, therefore, bear the character of a rational
existential dialectic" (p. 99) . It is to be noted that
Daane makes this heavily loaded assertion about Van
Til's ''basic presuppositions." The irrepressible reaction is - "fantastic."
THE CALV IN
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Daane's reconstruction of Van Til leads him to
believe that the biblical teaching of creation as a
definite work of God in time is placed in jeopardy
(p. 43). As a matter of simple fact no element in
Van Til's thinking receives more emphasis than the
doctrine of creation and the correlative distinction
between the Creator and the creature. Furthermore,
it is passing strange to read that Van Til's thinking
on the matter of cooperation between believers and
unbelievers "conceals the religious difference and
infringes on the nature of Christian witness" (p. 157).
A second feature of Daane's treatise must be
placed alongside of these wholly incongruous things
that he distills from Van Til's little book on common
grace. The book under review abounds in strongly
flavored language like the following. "Van Til's
wholly unbiblical conception of grace" (p. 64);
"loose thought and careless expression" (p. 69); "serious departure from the biblical conception of grace
and from the biblical conception of the nature of
God" (p. 72 ) ; "wholly presumptuous and illegitimate
procedure" (p. 104) "statement is freighted with
confusion and unrefined theological thought' (p. 126).
And the book is not without a suggestion of vitriol
in the author's ink bottle (see footnote, p. 114).
Worthy of note, in the third place, is the manner
in which factual matters are dealt with at points
where the issue in dispute is broached. We are told
in an historical judgment appearing early in Daane's
book that ''after almost thirty years of relative quiet,
common grace as defined in 1924 is now being
sharply criticized" (p. 16. Italics mine.) Can Daane
point to one definite and clearcut sentence in the
writings of Van Til where he "sharply" criticizes
the decisions of the synod of 1924? If Daa:ne means
to say that he understands Van Til's position to be a
sharp criticism of the three points of 1924, then the
use of the adverb "sharply" certainly begs the question in the introductory historical observation referred to.
Daane refers (pp. 147f.) to the controversy over
the teachings of Gordon H. Clark which disturbed
the Orthodox Presbyterian Church a few years back.
Daane's treatment of this debate reduces it to a conilict between what he r egards as two faulty posi
tions, namely, that of Clark and that of Van Til.
Such a description of the controversy is quite inaccurate and misleading. Theologians of repute who
are not necessarily committed to C. Van Til's manner
of theological formulation (the rest of the faculty
of Westminster Seminary, for instance) opposed
Clark's ideas on the ground that they contained elements that were decidedly unscriptw·al and unconfessional. The issue was most certainly not simply
Van Til ve1·sus Clark.
II
The manner in which Daane deals with the subject
of his surgical treatment is a fourth matter worthy of
careful attention. Here is a sample. Daane quotes
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Van Til as follows: "The general presentation comes
to a generality. It comes to 1sinners' differentiated
to be sure, as elect and reprobate in the mind of God,
but yet prior to their act of acceptance and rejection,
regarded as a generality. To forget this is to move
the calendar of God ahead" (pp. 51f). One of two
observations made by Daane on this passage is as
follows:

ingly we need not fear to assert that there is . . .
a certain good before God in the life of the historically undeveloped unbeliever' (p. 94). Since the 'historically undeveloped unbeliever' is mankind as
non-existent, i.e., the unbeliever in so far as he is
not historically real, the good that he performs is no
more l'eaJ than the non-reality which is said to perform this good" (p. 93). A reconstruction of a man's
... his placing the term sinn1m1 within quotation marks indi- thought that prompts one to deal thus with his words
cates how strongly he is opposed to the idea that the genc1·al
Clife', 1historically') suggests its own inherent weakofl'ct· is meaningful fo1· real, existent sinnct·s, for sinners as we
sec them in life. Fo1· Van Til contends that it is not to real, ness.
existent sinne1·s, as Point I of 1924 teaches, that the general
With regard to Daane's manner of treating his opoffer or salvation comes as an expression of common grnce. The
ponent
it is to be noted that he bases his critique,
genc1·al offer is not an expression of common grace when it
comes to real sinners as they confront us iu life. Hence Vall even as to Van Til's "basic presuppositions," excluTit's quotation ma1·ks around the wo1·d sim1e~·s (p. 52).
sively on the little book on common grace. It would
Isn't it rather high-handed to place so much weight seem reasonable to expect that Daane would have
on these two little marks around the word sinners? gone to Van Til's far more extensive writings to asThe statement itself distinguishes between such certain more exactly what his meanings arc. Such
sinne1·s as they are in the mind of God and as they a ch'astic overhauling of a man's thinking calls for
are in actual existence where they as real beings more exhaustive research than Daane's critique reveals.
accept or reject.
The same type of procedure is apparent in his dealing with a laconic statement by Van Til regarding
Point I of 1924. This is the statement: "For better
or for worse, Synod meant to teach that God has a
certain attitude of favor to all men as men." This
terse statement, called "highly significant" by the
critic, is given the following initial treatment:
The sti·ess in this sentence falls upon God's favor to all men
mrn, and it is in reference t.o this that Van Til's words 'for
better or for wo1·se' apply. The meaning of 'men as men' is
far from transparent. The phrase indicates that men can be
tegal'ded under some other category than the catego1·y of men,
but what. this category is, is not apparent. 'fhe task, therefore,
of those who desire to unde1·stand and evaluate Van Til's
comm011-p;rs:1.ce thougllt :is to disrove1· and evaluate this ether
catego1·y under which Van 'l'H i·cgawls men and defo1es common
grace'. As will be shown, it is precisely this question of God'i;
l'avor t.owurd men llR nw1t that coustitutcs the point of Vm1
Til's g1·calc•st proximity to tho thought of Hoeksema. It would,
ihereforr, have been not for worse but for better, if Van Tit
had not chosen to conceal his evaluation of Syuocl's teaching
behind the non-committal phrase, 'For better or fo1· WOl'sc....
(pp. 18-l9).
llH

It is to be noted that the brief sentence which receivcs this drastic and arbitrary treatment by Daane
is found in a context in which Van Til agrees with
Zwier in rejecting abstraction in a criticism directen
by Schilder against the decisions of 1924 (see Common Grace, p. 26).
There is in Van Til's book on common grace an
insistent emphasis which Daane's reconstruction
boldly sets aside. Van Til regards the question of
common grace as part of the larger problem of the
meaning of history. Van Til wants us to take history
seriously. His little book abounds in references to
history and the historical. He is concerned that the
historical Moment shall have real significance. He
calls upon all concerned with the problem at hand ''to
learn to take time more seriously than we have done"
(Common Grace, p. 64). In spite of this repeated
emphasis Daane deals as follows with a reference to
the historical by Van Til: "Van Til asserts, 1Accord176

All of these considerations raise a persistent question in this reviewer's mind. Is this book to be taken
seriously as an objective piece of theological writing,
or is it really only a "propaganda piece"? There is
another feature of the book that reinforces the pertinence of this question. Daane is determined to
show that Van Til disagrees with and denies the
teachings of the "Three Points" on common grace
adopted by the Synod of the Christian Reformed
Church in 1924. Nowhere can Daane point to one
sentence in which Van Til gives expression to such
basic disagreement and denial. Therefore Daane
subjects Van Til's book to a thorough process of overhauling, and on the basis of this ~reconstruction he
alleges that Van Til denies the teachings of 1924.
His right to make this allegation is not subject t0
question if he sincerely feels thus about it. But one
ought to be most careful that this allegation be always just that, and not a matter of simple, manifest
fact. What does Daane do? That which in the nature
of the case is only an allegation turns into a datum
or fact in Daane's book. As his argument progresses
he speaks freely of "Van Til's rejection of Point I"
(pp. 77 and 87), and of "Van Til's denial of Point l "
(p. 157). This is a most high-handed procedure that
violates the fairness and objectivity that characterize
responsible scholarship. It would seem altogether
proper that all such allegations be qualified by some
phrase like 11as I understand him," or ''as it seems
to me."

III
What shall we say as to Daane's argument? Ji
turns on. his understanding of certain crucial con~
cep.ts in Van Til's thinking on common grace and on
his.understanding of Van Til's starting point in formulating his conception of common grace. The two
significant concepts central to this discussion are
the concept "mankind as a generality'' and the con'I'HE
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cept "earlier" as applied to common grace. "All
common grace is earlier grace," says Van Til (Common Grace, p. 82).
Daane asserts that the common grace problem in
Van Til is "explicitly stated" as follows: "The common grace problem deals with this question: What do
entities which will one day be wholly different from
one another have in common before that final stage
of separation is reached" (Daane, p. 20, quoting Van
Til's Common Grace, p. 68). One can share some of
Daane's distaste for this particular formulation of the
problem. But, in all fairness to Van Til, one must
ask whether it is wholly correct to single out this
particular brief utterance as the explicit delineation
of the problem. The conte:h'iual setting does not
suggest that it was so intended. The sentence in
question appears in a section dealing with the matter
of mystery, and the very statement quoted above is
colored in its mode of expression by the setting in
which it is found.
Laying this question aside, we turn lo Daane's understanding of these terms. Van Til's "generality of
mankind" (which is the object of common grace)
is understood to be "a generality with non-existence.''
This understanding stems from the following statement by Van Til: "If we make the earlier our point
of departure for the later, we begin with something
that believers and unbelievers have in common.
That is to say, they have something in common because they do not yet exist. Yet they do exist. They
exist in Adam as their common representative"
(Common Grace, p. 72). With regard to his statement Daane says:
Thus Van Til de.fines mankind as a g-ene1·ality both in terms
cf e..xistence and ncn=cxistenae. ~~o·w~ it iiitu;t be U:ikcd, l-Vhut
can be defined in terms of both existence and non-cxistei1cc'?
We may begin to answer this question by nsserting that it cannot be anything real . . . Mankind as a gru1erality is a mental
idea which views existence under the form of eClll'lie1'. If, thinking only of existence, we ask what is eal'lier than existence,
the answer is non-exislcnco. Mankind as a generality, therefore,
is only a mental concept which views mankind befol'C it exists,
and, therefore, in the form of its non-existence (pp. 36£.).

Here, says Daane, is the explanation of Van Til's
reference to "men as men" in speaking of the intent
of Point 1 of 1924. "For 'men as men' are always
existent men, and common grace, in Van Til's
thoughts, is always earlier than men's existence and
only extends to mankind as a generality" (p. 37).
The next step in Daane's reconstruction of Van
Til is to assert that he equates existence with selfconsciousness (hence the charge of idealism against
Van Til). History is a process in which the undifferentiated generality of men (or "mankind in general,"
as Van Til also expresses the idea) moves forward to
the time when men will be fully self-conscious
members of the elect family of God or fully selfconscious members of the class of the reprobate.
Because no Christian is ever completely free from
sin (and hence is not completely self-conscious as
a Christian living and breathing his confession at
THE CALVIN FORUM "
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every point) and the reprobate is never absolutely
evil, the generality of mankind remains such in
some degree to the very end of time. However, as
time progresses there will be increasing self-consciousness on the part of the elect and the reprobate, so
that on the part of the reprobate there will be increasing hostility against the kingdom of God. "Each man
is on the move," says Van Til (Common Grace,
p. 92).
All of this Daane interprets as movement from a
generality which is non-existent to the actual existence of men as flesh and blood realities. And here
the concept earlier comes into play. The earlier of
common grace is correlative with the earlier character of this non-existent generality. It is earlier grace,
earlier than existence. Yes, "Van Til's earlier is
earlier than creation, earlier than created time and
created realities" (p. 42). In fact, Van Til's earlier
"is as early as the eternal decrees of election und
reprobation" (p. 42).
And here is Van Tit's starting point says Daane,
namely, in the "abstract ideas of election and reprobation" (p. 28). Real men do not yet exist in election
and therefore the ideas are "abstract." Van Til relates the common grace problem to pre-Fall time,
when the elect and the reprobate were not yet real
existent beings. "To speak of common grace as real
before the Fall is a capitulation to abstract thinking
. ... The common grace problem is said to be a real
problem in sinless time. The elect and the reprobate
are said to have much in common in sinless Adam
because they do not yet exist. . .. Common grace is
said to be a historical attitude of God toward men
not yet within history because they are not yet within existence;; (p. 46).
Although there are some points at which one might
wish for more clarification on pages 72ff. in Van Til's
book, still his meaning in the main is fairly clear. He
is dealing with the matter of the divine attitude. God
has had an attitude of favor toward mankind as represented in Adam. This turned to an attitude of
wrath toward mankind in fallen Adam. Therefore,
since God has had a common attitude toward mankind in general, mankind as yet historically undifferentiated into the elect and reprobate, we have warrant, argues Van Til, for believing in an attitude of
common favor or grace by God upon mankind now in
actual hfatory, upon mankind in general, mankind
not yet fully dillerentiated.
Daane contends that "the shadow of the fictional
falls over" Van Til's common grace theology in all
of its ramifications. Common grace is directed toward a non-existent generality of mankind. The
offer of the gospel is given to the same non-existent
generality. Why is this so for Daane? It is because
Van Til's "whole common-grace theology and his
epistemology rest on the fallacious assumption that
it is possible for something to be both existent and
non-existent, and yet real" (pp. 158f.).
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This reductio ad absurdurn, this reduction to meaninglessness of Van Til's common grace theology rests,
in my opinion, on a failure to understand Van Til.
Daane has read strange and almost fantastic meanings into Van Til's terms, often on very scanty
quoted evidence, and with these meanings he has
sought to force Van Til to amazing conclusions. A
good illustration of the manner in which Daane has
misw1derstood Van Til is found in his reference to
"Van Til's principle that at the end of the historical
process, the generality disappears. . . .If mankind
as a generality were something real and something
that actually enjoyed existence, Van Til could not
posit that mankind as a generality disappears at
the end of history, for it is an elemental biblical
principle that God does not allow any created reality
to slip into nothingness, i.e., to utterly disappear"
(pp. 38£.). All Van Til means to say here, it seems
to this reviewer, is that one day all men will finally
make up either the company of the elect or of the
reprobate. All men will in actual reality be differentiated into the two camps appointed by the sovereign God. Hence, there will no longer be a generalit.y of men who are as yet neither elect or reprobate
h1 actual historical fact.
Does Van Til found his idea of common grace
finally on the "abstract ideas of election and reprobation?" I think not. It seems much more accurate to say that he takes his starting point from
the fact of the existence of elect and reprobate beings in history who are moving toward the day
when the number of both elect and reprobate will
be full, quantitatively and qualitatively. If Daane
had honored Van Til's insistence on the significance

of history in a..'ld for the common grace problem;
he would not have reduced Van TH's common grace
thought to meaninglessness and nothingness. Then
Daane would have been more sensitive to the movement of actual history through the sentence which
he believes "explicitly" states the problem of common grace as Van Til sees it; "What do entities
[beings, E.H. l which will one day be wholly different
from one another have in common before that final
stage of separation is reached?" To be sure, Van Til
looks at history against the background of the counsel of God. But no Calvjnist can find reason for reproach in this.
IV
Before this review is concluded, a matter of no
lHtle importance remains. It has to do with the
place of the decree of God in Daane's book. In the
opinion of this reviewer Daane does not do justice
to this highly important clement in theology, particularly with regard to the decree of reprobation.
The grounds for thls opinion are given as follows:
( 1) Daane charges that Van Til "fallaciously assumes the equal ultimcicy of election and reprobation" (p. 25). Those who speak thus take upon themselves the burden of explaining just what they mean.
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Daane indicates his meaning by saying that equal
uliimacy here involves "the principle that both are
equally definitive of the sovereign purposes of God"
(Ln., p. 25). Whatever may be the merit of the
particular manner in which Daane raises the question, we must insist that we be most careful to remain
true to the scriptural data bearing on this matter
with its many complexities, and that we do not
decide such delicate balances in the decree of God
by the introduction of moments of human logic into
the sovereign counsel of the Almighty. Of first im·
portance in speaking of the decree of God is to assert
that "the divine decree is one . . . . a single, allcomprehensive, and simultaneous act" (see Berkbof,
Systematic Theology, p. 102). Who shall determine
the shades of ultimacy in that decree? Are not all
elements of God's decree or counsel final, unalterable,
efficacious, sovereign, unconditional and absolute?
Ile who insists Lhat all elements in God's decree arc
equally ultimate need not agree to Daane's description of the position as meaning that "God is as much
interested in the damnation of the reprobate as in
the salvation of the elect" (p. 25). Such language
again reads human feeling moments into the secret
counsel of God. To be sure, Reformed theology has
discussed the matter of the "order" of the divine
decree (s). But the discernment of "order" in the
decree (s) would seem to have nothing to do with the
positing of variations in the ultimacy of the elements
in the decree(s) of God.
(2) In a significant footnote Daane takes the
position that there arc in the counsel of God "genuine
possibilities that do not become actualities in history"
(p. 68). Possibly there is confusion of terms here.
If Daane is confusing God's counsel with His knowledge then we can do no more than point out the confusion. But if Daane means to equate the terms
counsel of Goel and decree of God (which is standard Reformed practice) I must demur. Berkhof
says: "The decree of God bears the closest relation
to the divine knowledge. There is in God ... a neccessary knowledge, including all possible ca.uses and
results. This knowledge furnishes the material for
the decree; it is the perfect fountain out of which
God drew the thoughts which He desired to objectify.
Out of ihis knowledye. uf all things possible Ile chose,
by an act of His perfect will, led by wise considerations, what He wanted to bring to realization, and
thus formed His eternal purpose" (Systematic Theology, p. 102. Italics mine). God knows all possibilities, but only what He intends to actualize in fact
is part of Hjs decree. The Westminster Confession
and Catechisms plainly restrict the decree of God
to "whatsoever comes to pass." What it means to
allow for unactualized possibilities in the decree of
God is something to ponder seriously.
(3) On page 132 we meet the following arresting statement: "Each response to common grace,
whether that of the elect or of the reprobate, reduces
the significance of common grace by reducing the
1
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and barely as human decision, or is it the fact that
such decision is grounded in and expressive of the
sovereign grace of God who "chose us in him before
the foundation of the world?"
(6) One experience's a keen sense of discomfort
on reading of election and reprobation as "abstract
ideas." By so designating them Daane means to say
that men are not yet actual historical beings when
we think of them in the decree of God. The point is
obvious enough. But one must ask whether an
existential phenomenalism is the only gauge of
reality. Does not God's decree carry within itself
determination of all the facts and factors that enter
into its own efficacious actualization? One who has
(4) The same question presses itself upon us
a healthy biblical sense of the sovereign reality of
in connection with a comment on Van Til's notion
God, the reality above and antecedent to all reality,
of the offer of the gospel. Says Daane: "An offer of
should not speak of these two facets of God's decree
salvation which has meaning only for that which
as "abstract." Daane should have taken Van Til's
by its very nature cannot in any event be saved, and
"concrete universal," the "ontological trinity," more
which regardless of any decision must be annulled,
seriously.
can hardly be called a meaningful offer of salvation, nor can the moment in which it is offered be
This review has not been written on the supposicalled a serious moment" (pp. 121£.). To be sure,
tion that there are no points in Van Til's exposition
this statement is found in a context dealing with
on common grace that are without need of further
the irrelevance of the offer of the gospel to a generalexposition.
Van Til intimates his own awareness
ity of mankind which is non-existent, in Daane's
of such need when he describes his positive ideas
understanding of Van Til. "Non-existence cannot be
as "suggestions" for further study. It is hoped that
saved," says Daane in the previous paragraph, "for
our
evident purpose has been to ascertain whether
it is nothing." If this context completely determined
Daane has understood Van Til aright by way of an
the meaning of the sentence in question, we could
say nothing with regard to it other than to challenge objective inquiry. Our conclusion is, as already indicated, that Daane has not achieved these goals.
the conectness of Daane's understanding of Van
Til's generality of mankind. But the insertion of the A book that seeks to reduce the efforts of a recognized
Reformed scholar to absurdity is of little real help
clause "regardless of any decision'' moves the meanin
gaining further light on a complex problem. It
ing of the sentence beyond the context. And the
is
to
be hoped that vve can carry on our discussions
prepositional phrase "in any event" seems strangely
on
a
higher
and more .fruitful plane in the future.
incongruous here. Plainly Daane's thought has
moved beyond the point where men are regarded as
a non-existenl generality, for non-existent being
William Young
make no decisions. Therefore we arc again forced
to ask what reprobation means to Daane. Can the
R. CORNELIUS VAN TIL has distinguished
reprobate ever be anything but unsaved, and can
himself as a relentless polemicist in a numthey ever make any decision except that which is in
ber of theological controvcrsif's. In the
keeping with their reprobate nature? Furthermore,
discussion over common grace, however,
are we to understand that the moment in which the he has attempted to occupy a more irenic role in the
gospel is offere<l cnn be serious only if we think of the midst of conflicting voices withm Reformed circles.
certain character of reprobation as suspended in In this attempt, he has called attention to aspects of
that moment?
the problem which had been overlooked in previous
(5) "A significant moment," says Daane, "is a stages of the consideration of the doctrine. Certain
point in which a serious decision, a decision that of these aspects stand in the forefront of Dr. James
makes a difference can be made" (p. 119). Is human Daane's critical evaluation of Van Til's views in A
action the criterion of significance, of meaningfulness Theology of G1·ace.
in history? Is not Van Til on more solid ground, more
I
truly Reformed ground when he consistently declares
The reader of this critique of Van Til is apt to
that history has meaning because of the counsel of experience a certain perplexity if he has some preGod? The human action has significance precisely vious acquaintance with Van Til's publications on
because it expresses the counsel of God, and not just the subject. Daane pursues a line of argument which
because "it makes a difference." To be concrete, appears to embody a sustained misunderstanding of
what is it that makes the "moment'' of conversion Van Til's views. Repeated instances occur in which
significant? Is il the human decision simply Van Til is represented as implying doctrines which
amount of common grace, and thus each succeeding
moment is less significant regardless of the nature of
£he ethical response of the preceding moment"
(italics mine). What does Daane mean to say in this
final clause'? Can the reprobate respond to the common grace of God in a manner that is ethically good
before Him? A similar question is prompted by another remark, namely, "There is nothing conditional
about a kind of common grace which must necessarily pass away, and must necessarily pass away regardless of the nature of the ethical response given"
(p. 127). We may well ask Daane what reprobation
means to him.
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he has in fact explicitly disavowed. The attempt to
demonstrate that these views are entailed by Van
Til's principles is marred by .fallacious reasoning.
Some details have been mentioned by Lawrence N.
Manross in the Westminster Theological Journal>
Vol. XVII no. 1, pp. 60ff. Instead of adding to the
number of instances the present remarks will be
addressed to more general considerations bearing on
the method employed by Daane in discussing Van
Til's conception of common grace.
A student of Kierkegaard could raise the quest.ion whether Dr. Daane is using a method of indirect communication with a view to exposing
certain technical weaknesses in Van Til's method of
polemics as well as in Ms constructive expositions.
A Theology of Gmce might in this case be judged to
be not without merit as a clever piece of theological
satire. Among other considerations, the orientation
of Daane's work to the three points on common grace
formulated in 1924 forbids the serious entertaining
of this hypothesis as to the nature of his effort. Yet
this bold suggestion, untenable as it may be, prompts
the raising of the following question: Can it be that
Daane has unconsciously adopted certain techniques
from Van TH and has applied these very devices
against the master?
The question answers itself when Daane is discovering alleging that there is no room in Van Til's
common-grace theology for the reality of Adam
(p. 40), and more genernJly that Van Til's position
is a type of existential dialecticism. 1 Reminiscent of
Van Til's polemic style is not only the allegation that
an opponent really holds a view which he explicitly
rejects! but also argument in support of such allegation by a vague appeal to what "the very structure"
of the adversary's thought "demands" (p. 50). In
the instance here cited the very structure of Van
Til's common-grace theology is said Lo be <(constructed oui of the dialectical inter-play of nonexistence and existence."
The monotony of this interplay, which is the major
achievement of Daane's inquiry, may be a mark of
what he himself terms "a mere exercise in abstract.ion" (p. 152). In fact, the whole work is infected
with that "constant tendency toward Rationalism"
(p. 112) which, oddly enough, is imputed to historic
t In connection with the exposition of the views of othel'
w1·iters, Daane's interpretations of the classical philosophers,
Kant and Hegel, tend to be misleading. The interest exhibited
is not in impal'tial understanding but in fu.rnishing ammunition
for the battle at hand. Kant's insistence on objectivity in terms
of universal validity of knowledge and conformily of nature to
law fails to receive justice in the interpretation that "all such
knowledge is merely n J1umnn creation" (p. 144). And where
does Hegel claim· to he able "to p1·edict. the Absolute'r; future
movements" (p. 138)? It would be odd for Hegel to be int.crested in prediction if ho really supported. as Daane assel'ts, thal
"in his time and tl1ought, histol'y had reached its goal" (p. 114).
At the close of his History of Philosophy, however, Hegel claims
only that the series of spiritual forms is closed for the present
(fil1· jotzt) with the standpoint of the present time. Christian
scholarship should dissociate itself from the fashionable p1·acticc
of repeating well-WOl'll criticisms of Hegel which only betray
ignorance of the texts of the philosopher.
'
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Reformed theology. Incidentally, can the aversion to
rationalism of the traditional Reformed type (not to
speak of antipathy toward determinism voiced repeatedly) be a symptom of an influence of contempornry irrationalism?
II

Possibly there is a sense in which a cramped rationalism in the sense of schematic formalism has
exercised an adverse influence on systems of theology. Such a rationalism commonly abuses theological language by framing pseudo-statements that exceed the bounds of Revelation and have no bearing
on Christian experience. The assertion of pseudopropositions is accompanied by the employment of
pseudo-arguments. The polemic directed against
Van Til is marred by such improprieties in the use
of theological language. As an indirect proof that
Van Til has committed the same sort of impropriety
in the infelicitous use of language, the discussion may
have some value. Yet on behalf of Van Til the consideration can be adduced that by his content he
often compensates for defects of form.
Reformed writers of our day ought to pay attention not only to the truth and falsity of statements
buL also to other features of theological utterances
in which basic issues may be involved. Theologians
would be well advised to inquire whether their
utterances are felicitous or infelicitous, conducive to
the promotion of piety and the Glory of God or the
reverse. 2 Attention to these features of religious
language as well as to the truth of doctrinal statements has ever characterized the truly great theolnrr;
~n1c:
.a.-o.a.""_.AU•
:i As an im;lauce of infelicity, the ten<le11cy to focus attention
on common grace to the relative neglect. of particular grace may
l:Je ment.ioned. The chapter on "Van Til's Conception of Grace"
is disappointing- in this respect. The al'gumentation in pp. 63f.
can leave the 1·cader wit.h the feeling that either the general offel'
is being gl'ounded in a universul atonement or Plse that an unwarrnnted identification of gracP with common grace permeates
the discussion. The second alternative is suppo1·ted by the fact
that such an identification provides ptwt of the basis for the fallacious argument by which Van Til is allegedly shown to deny
any point of contact between sin and grace. In a footnote on
p. GS, doubt. is expl'cssed "whether the usual clear-cut distinctions between common and saving grace can be maintained
if t.he general offer of t.hti gospel is a gracious offer." As against
1mcJ1 an interpretation of point one of 1924, Van Tit's emphasis
on the particularity of CTod's free a11d sovereign grace must be
deemed salul.a1·y.
Infelicity and inaccuracy appem· also in the i·eferences to the
unhappy discussions of the incomprehensibility of God in the
Orthodox Presbyterian Chm·ch. The proceedings over the complaint against. Dr. Go1·don H. Clark's ordination are incorrectly
te1·med a "heresy trial" (p. 147}. The point in dispute is misunderstood as though it. concerned the identification of the human
with the divine manner of knowing. D1-. Clark in fact so cleal'ly
distinguished t.he 111,odc of man's knowing from the mode of
God's knowing that the complainants, of whom Van Tit was one,
never tried to claim lhe contral'y. Daane would have strengthened his criticism of Van Til at this point if he had refrained
from asserting that each side of the diepute maintained an element. of truth. A more precise formulation of the question
might have led to the dismissal of the entire dispute over qualitnLive difference of the "content" of kno\\·ledge as a striking
instance of infelicity and impropriety in the use of language
rathel' than as a genuine theological issue whern the tl'Uth 01·
falsity of a ca!'dinal doctrine is at stake.
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Leonard Verduin
iHE title of A Theology of Gmce is something of a misnomer. This is not theology
(although the book contains excellent theological insights, with the needed Biblical orientation). Nor is it "of Grace" (at best it deals with
common grace). The sub-title, however, adequately
sets forth the contents of the book: "An Inquiry into
and an Evaluation of Dr. C. Van Til's Doctrine of
Common Grace."
As has been said already, this is not theology but
philosophy. This fact does not make the book less
valuable. Moreover it could not well be otherwise;
for the quite sufficient reason that the book it discusses is itself philosophy. He who would criticize
a philosophy must himself write in a philosophic
vein.
This is not an easy book to review. Not as though
it were not lucidly written, but, because this review
must be a review of a review. One finds it impossible
to talk about Daane's book intelligently without
talking about Van Til's the while.
Anyone conversant with Van Til's thought habits
will have detected in him a veritable phobia for thatwhich-men-of-all-categories-have-in-common.
He
is much happier in the presence of evidence for discontinuity between believer and disbeliever than he
is in the presence of evidence for continuity between
them. (This need not surprise anyone. Dr. Van Til
has rebelled vehemently against the modern spirit
that is happier in the presence of evidence for continuity than it is in the presence of evidence for discontinuity, and his whole thought is in the signature
of this rebellion.)
One is eager to see what treatment that which is
common will have in a mind so conditioned. For
common grace has as its distinguishing characteristic
that it is common. It is called common because men
of all categories have it in common. What will happen to a theological item of which the distinguishing
feature is continuity as it passes through a theological system of which the distinguisl1ing feature is a
penchant for discontinuity? Will the commonness of
common grace survive'? Or will it lose its commonness as it passes through?
Daane says it does not survive. The common
grace that went into the hopper of Van Til's thought
was a commodity which saints and sinners have in
common; the "common grace" that comes out is a
something that pertains to what Van Til calls manin-the-state-of-undifferentiatedness. Common grnce
in his system is an attitude of God toward the it of
as-yet-undifferentiated-humankind; it is decidely not
an attitude of God toward the them of saints and sinners. If the commonness of common grace survives
at all in Van Til's system it survives at the expense
of the differentiation of saint and sinner - the very
polarity that earned for it the adjective common. In
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commonsense language, the categories of saint and
sinner are necessary to common grace; Van Til
denies that common grace pertains to saints and
sinners as such; it is therefore hard to see how this
is less than a .forthright denial of common grace.
Dr. Daane has located this Achilles heel in Van
Til's thought and has grasped it firmly. It is the
opinion of this reviewer that it will not be easy for
Van Til to shake him off.
Daane indicates that this manipulation whereby
Van Til gets man-as-as-yet-not-differentiated (toward which God has the attitude of graciousness
called common grace) and man-as-already-differentiated (toward which He does not) is essentially a sellout to existentialist thought habits. This constitutes
Daane's most basic criticism. We feel that he is in a
large way right.
Commonsensically, scientifically, also theologically, it is illegitimate to predicate things of a commonality which we in 1.he same breath deny touching the
differentiated individuals of whom the commonality
exists. Van Til has a strange way of speaking of favor on the part of God toward an it, toward "the
originally created good nature of man." But, neither
God nor man can be gracious to an it, to a nature. It
is too late in the day to talk about the group (in casu,
the commonality called "Man") as though it did not
consist of individuals (in casu, differentiated ''Men").
One cannot be a massist now and an atomist later.
He who tries it in the idiom of dialectic existentialism
is simply repeating an old error in youthful term inology.
Daane points out (the present reviewer is of the
opinion he should have borne dowT1 even more heavily at this point) that on his own premises Van Til
is not entitled to his mass-vs.-individualized-particu)ars device. If, as Van Til tells us at the outset and
all along, our most basic interpretive concept is
the ontological trinity in which commonaDty and
particularity are equally ultimate, by what right does
Van Til deal with men now under the aspect of
commonality and later under the aspect of particularity? Are these not also equally ultimate in man?
In this review we have touched upon only a few
of the facets of Daane's contribution. There are many
more - awaiting the reader who is willing to work
as he reads. Daane's book is one of meatiest ever
to emerge from a Christian Reformed manse.
(Incidentally, the publisher has allowed the proofreader to get away with things. Misprints abound.
Passing over comparatively innocent slips, such as
Kiergegaard (p. 146), correlation (p. 138), Bavink
(p. 3?), etc., we call attention to "prediction" for
"predication" "(p. 26), "common race" for "common
grace" (p. 33). Even more disturbing is "dialect''
for dialectic (p. 39 bis), a word that occurs as "dialetics" on p. 99. Dr. Daane's book is good enough to
deserve more careful printing.)
181

On Brute Facts*
Harold J. Franz
We propose to do two things:
1. to show how Dr. Van Til and A. Kuyper
really are insisting upon the same viewpoint,
Dr. Van Til's criticism notwithstanding.
2. to show the ambiguity of Mr. Orlebeke's position as he fluctuates between a realistic and
a Christian position.
IRST let us try to make clear the real problem
facing any Christian apologist. We can do
this readily if we give careful attention to
the classic formulation of Abraham Kuyper.
In the midst of his Encyclopedia, Kuyper makes a
distinction (discarded in a day of science) between
truth-falsehood and accuracy-error. He who in good
.faith has made an error has been inaccurate, but
not necessarily untrue. 22 Mistakes can be corrected
and indeed history's progress is just such a process
of clarification. "Vanity of mind," falsehood, on the
contrary, is a basic religious approach to one's perspective in life which conditions all of a man's theoretical inquiry in a way impossible to repair except
by a fresh orientation. Kuyper appeals to the message of Jesus. "I am the Way, the Truth and the
Life," setting it in juxtaposition to the "lie" of the
religious leaders of Jesus' day in order to make clear
this distinction. He speaks:

CJ

In ti1is conditio11 of affairs a holy interest is at stake in this
struggle for ti-uth. This conflict does uot aim at the corl'cction
of mistakes in tho representation, 11either does it combat prejudice, nor rectify in accuracies; but arrays itself against a powel',
which ever in a new Io1m entangles om· human consciousness in
that which is false, makes us servants to falsehood and blinds
us to l'eality.23

But lest we mistake the import of Kuyper's distinction and confuse it with any theological tilt between heretic and conservative, notice that Kuyper
reformulates this distinction in terms of two incompatible sciences, bodies of knowledge.
The proposition, that in virtue of the fact of palingcnesis n
science develops itself by the side of the naturalistic, which
though formally alJicd to it, is diffe1·ently disposed and therefol'o different in its conclusions, and stands over against it as
'Christian' science must not be understood in a specifically theological, but in nu absolutely universal sensc,2'1

This is the root of Kuyper's position: the religious
attitude which lies at the heart of each man's formulation of his total world of experience determines
the orientation and hence the organization of that
world-and-life view. Basically, there are two alternatives: love of truth or love of lie, child of God or
2:1 Kuyper, op. uit., p. 107.
u Ibid., p. 115.
24 Ibid., p. 181.

• This concludes an article the first part oC which appearNI
in the Minch n11mbc1· of the Formn.
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child of Satan, Christian or pagan system of knowledge.
Those who i;tudy science under the influence of palingenesis
(l'cgeneration), as well as those who leave it out of account, can
only hold fo1· true what rests on their own premises and thus
appreciate each other's study only in a formal manner. That
with the Christian as well as with naturalistic science, that only
stands scientifically sure which going out from its own premises, each has obtained as the i·esult of scientific research ... 2:;

The antithesis is complete. Kuyper intends that
there shall be no common accounting of the items of
experience for Christian and non-Christian. There
is only one Truth, one Science: the Christian Revelation. "The Christian must maintain the unity of
the sciences in truth and this truth as opposed to the
unity of the pagan science in lie ...the negative for
the one determines the positive for the other." 2"
It is just this position which Van Til prizes so
highly in his evaluation of Kuyper. Anyone who
reads Van Til's writings and then attempts to set
Kuyper and Van Til in opposition has obviously
missed the point. Dr. Van Til, himself, openly avows
bis indebtedness by use of the figure of standing upon
the shoulders of another, namely Abraham Kuyper.21 But if Van Til is indebted to Kuyper, he rightly seeks to pay his respect, not by slavish imitation,
but by further elucidation of the problem. In Van
Til's own mind, there are difficulties of formulation
and expression that seem to rob Kuyper's magnifici ent insights of their full glory and effective use.
Kuyper seems to fail of reaching the full antithesis
of pagan versus Christian by continually reminding
us that there can be a formal agreement between
pagan and Christian. (This reminder of Kuyper
can be observed readily, by rereading each of the
above quotations from the Encyclopedia.) Kuyper
specifies some of these "formal areas of agreement,"
such as the activity of counting (arithmetic), of
logic, and of language.
The bifurcation must extend as far as the influence of those
subjective factol'S which palingenesis causes to be different in
one than in the other. He11ce all scientific tesearch which has
things seen only as object or which is 1n·osecuted simply by those
subjective factors which have underg·one no change, remains
the same for bolh. Near the ground, the tree of science is one
for aU.28

It is this distinction of "formal agreement" which
Dr. Van Til feels is so harmful. For Van Til interprets this to mean that there are some areas in the
pursuit of knowledge which by their supposed objective character are exempt from the workings of
25
:!6
21
:!8

Loe. ci£.
Ibid., p. 168.
Van Til, Common Grace (Philadelphia: 1947), J>. :15.
Kuyper, op. cit., p. 168.
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sin. The "Lie" does not enter into the "factual"
sciences because these are public, open to correction merely by more accurate inspection and careful recording.

~'e are to hold, accol'ding to Kuyper's argument, that, where

sin has 11ot changed the metaphysical situation, the difference
between the believei: a11d unbeliever need not be brought to the
fol'C.21)

l

l

I have two things on which to comment before
we e1'amine this criticism in the light of Kuyper's
writing. First, there is a difference in the above
quotation as found in H. DeVries translation of the
Encyclopedia and in Dr. Van Til's first-hand translation from the Dutch edition. I have used DeVries
because I feel it more faithfully adheres to the overtones of the words and the context, than does that
of Dr. Van Til. However, even using Van Til's
translation, we may develop the interpretation which
I seek to eludicate. I say this lest I be criticized for
basing my exegesis of Kuyper on one passage or one
translation of a passage. Secondly, even Dr. Van
Til, while developing this criticism, does not feel
that he therefore places himself against Kuyper.
Rather does he appeal to the ambiguities of Kuyper's
own treatment and of the two incompatible viewpoints hidden in these ambiguities. It is his judgment that he remains faithful to the best and most
decisive in Kuyper. 30
In seeking to obviate this weakness Van Til suggests a further distinction. He suggests that if we
consider Christian and pagan knowledge epistemologically, we must hold to Kuyper's antitheses. There
is no common ground. However, viewing the situation in which both the pagan and Christian find
themselves, we can and should admit that they have
a metaphysical common ground. To put this distinction as pointedly and clearly as we can, we may say
they both have in common the activities of life and
human beings: i.e., eating, sleeping, seeing objects,
talking, even thinking! However, when each man
seeks to rationalize his experience, he has to commit
himself to either 0£ two exclusive points of view: he
is either a Christian or a pagan.
It is either the would-be autonomous miin, who weighs and
measures whctt ha thinks of as brute Ol' bare facts by the help
of •what /i(>. tlii11k.~ flf as abstl'act impersonal principJcs, or it is
the believer, knowing hi1nself to be a creatme of God, who
weighs and measiu-es what ha thinks of' as God-c!'eated facts by
what he thinks of as God-created laws.al

Please pay particular attention to the peculiar
circumlocution Van Til employs in order to make
clear his distinction. The underlined portions, ''by
what he thinks of... " make all the difference between the epistemological task and the metaphysical
situation. Those who criticize Van Til for allowing
no "common ground" and then argue that we all
do see flowers and trees and hear the wind, birds
and bees, have obviously missed the whole point of
the argwnent. We all have ''experience" and indeed
20
30
31
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IV
Let us return in our discussion to Kuyper in order
to see whether or not Dr. Van Til has done justice
to him. When we reread Kuyper, we find that his
distinction of "formal agreement" rather than disagreeing with Van Til, is really parallel in intention
and purpose with Van Til's own distinction of epistemological-metaphysical. Kuyper, having set forth
the clear antithesis of pagan and Christian knowledge, then asks why this antithesis was not crystal
clear from the inception of Christianity. His answer
is twofold:
1. because there is a broad realm of investigation in which
the differences betwee11 the two groups exerts no influence . . .
2. it js a slow process which must ensue before any activity can develop itself from what potentially is given in pali11gcnesii;. If palingenesis operated immediately from the centrum
of our inne1· life to the outermost circumference of our being
and consciousness, the antithesis between the science that lives
by H and tl1at which denies it, would be at once absolute h1
every subject.32

It is this first reason which bothers Van Til. What
is this broad realm of investigation common to all,
not influenced by the antithesis? Kuyper specifies
it as the domain of the senses, the «plastic conception
of visible things," "the entire domain of the more
primary observation, which limits itself to weights,
measures, numbers, is common to both."38 I wish
I could quote fully the passage in which Kuyper
sets forth his argument for this assertion. The remarkable insight of Kuyper into the working of
science causes him to emphasize "the absolute character of perception by the senses" which is the
ground for any certainty or validity of the natural
sciences. Equally significant in emphasis is his
insistence that these operations are not science.
However rich and fruitful these observations are in
subduing nature, they are to be compared to the
farmer's lore of tilling and breeding and not to the
theoretical predicting power of the scientist. In
another context, that of describing the "animal
faith" which is the root of certainty in life, Kuyper
again argues that merely to observe or count is not
science: science begins where observation leaves off.
Granted, therefore, that tho preparation of the clrnmist is scientific, that llis purpose lies in science, that presently he will go
to work scientifically with what has been observed. Very well,
if only you concede that his obse1·vatio11 as such lacks all scientific cha1·acter, and that a chemist who confu1es hirnslef to observation would not be pl'osecuti.:ng science at al!.3·L

If we read carefully his treatment of those previously specified areas of formal agreement, i.e.,
language, logic, counting, again we will find Kuyper
radically qualifying his assertions of "common to
all." Language is an objective study. It consists of
examining archives, unearthing monuments, translating, analyzing forms of languages and the relaa2 Kuyper, op. cit., p. 162.
sa Ibid., p. 157ff.

Van Til, op. cit., p. 43.
lbicl., p. 42.
Ibid., p. 44.
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tion of language to sense experience. Yet for all of
this he says:
This should not be granted too absolutely, and the determination
whether an objcctivo document is genuine or not, or whether
the contents of it must be translated thus and so, is in many
cases not susceptible to such an absolute decision.3r.

area there is only antithesis, the two hypotheticaldeductive systems are directly contradictory. Van
Til's distinction in Kuyper's terms amounts to this:
there is "formal recognition" (the practical, prescientific activities of life), there is no "material
recognition,, (the borrowing of materials as epistemologically equivalent for any theoretical viewpoint.)

If in the lighL of more recent and intense debate
on the analysis of historical "fact" we may question
the details of Kuyper,s accounting for historical
"description,,, we should not let our eyes be blinded
v
to the fact that even here Kuyper will not allow
It is important to reemphasize, that Van Til and
for an absolute objectivity to be awarded to historiKuyper
can not be antagonized. To antagonize them
cal and textual criticism. How much more clear is
would
be
to accept the faulty interpretation which
Kuyper,s rejection o.f the neutrality or objectivity
Van
Til
and
many others have placed upon Kuyper.
of logic. Logic is a common tool providing a means
Nevertheless,
if Van Til is wrong in his criticism,
of critical examination and verification "insofar at
is right in his intent and he faithfully preserves
he
least as the resuU strictly depends upon the deduction made . . ." and in order that the viewpoints seek the significance of Kuyper's viewpoint. As we conto justify themselves over against one another. Exer- sider Mr. Orlcbcke's discussion of the problem, we
cising caution again as to the meaning of 11 justify," ought immediately to disqualify his "avowed defense
"verification," and "examination,,, and seeking for of Kuyper." Indeed 1 it seems clear in my mind that
the reason .for this affirmation, we read this radical Van Til's criticism of Kuyper really can be levelled
against the ambiguity of Mr. Orlebeke's Realism,
statement of "antithesis.,,
For though it is well known bofo1·cha11d that even at this point and in fact, Kuyper would join heartily in the critiof inte1·section, no ao1·eenwnt can be 1·eached; for then no di- cism! Notwithstanding this, we ought to also notice
verge-nee would follow; yet at this point of intersection it can be that Mr. Orlebeke in many of his utterance professes
explained to each othet what it is that compels us, from this
point of i11terseclio11 to dtaw our line as we do ... 36 (Italics close alliance at least io Kuyper, and wants to consider himself as standing firmly in the Reformed
mine)
Adding up all of these qualifying caveats, we gain tradition. Witness his explicit statement of the antia total impression which differs little in import from thesis: "From the ultimate point-of-view the 'nathat of Van Til. The 11formal recognition" to be mu- tural' man knows nothing truly, and from the same
tually accorded both antithetical science-systems is ultimate point-of-view the Christian knows every
warranted only of those practical activities that un- thing truly.""~ Notice also his sharp distinction of
derlie all intellectual effort. In themselves these natural theology and general revelation:
areas of formal agreement are pre-scientific and even Unless there be l'('Velation, man can know nothing· about God.
t'hnnn'h
H'"'" .LV.4.&.
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builds, they arc not specifically scientific.
Hence formal l'ccognition only is possible from either side. The
g·i·ateful accopLt111cc of those tosults of investigatiou which lie
outside the point i11 question, is no i·ecognition, but is merely a
1·eaping or harvests from common ficlds.37

But there is revelation. General revelation, as Calvin says, is
objectively pcnipicuous a11d sufficient to convince any rightmindcd mun that Gotl, the C!'cator and Ruler of the universe
exists. 'l'hc bc•auty of the llowers in the field, for example would
be impossi blc if God cl id not exist.so
'

He further makes his position clear by asseverating
that unless the grace 0£ God intervene in the mind
This contrast oI pre-scientific practical activity
(This I equate with the metaphysical common-situa- of the unbeliever, there can be no genuine conviction
in the final proof of the Christian position.
tion to which Van Til refers) with actual scientific
What Mr. Orlebeke is interested in maintaining in
procedure merits our careful attention. In a day
11
contradistinction
to Van Til is that even though the
when we speak glibly of scientism,,, as the dangel'
unbeliever
never
has the full-bodied truth, he can
of spinning speculative theories beyond the support
attain
to
"partial
truths" which the Christian dare
of .facts, we should remind ourselves that science is
the ability to predict or post-diet. This ability is di- not discount. The statement of Socrates that it is
rectly proportionate to the ability of the scientist to better to suffer injustice than to commit injustices
generate a hypothesis flexible enough to meet the is such a partially true statement which it is sinrequirements of the situation and fruitful enough to fully arrogant to deny. The reason Mr. Orlebeke
find new areas of experience to control. Without this gives for mainLaining this position is simply that
making of hypotheses or theorizing, there is no sci- inasmuch and to the extent that the Christian and
ence, only accident. Science is hypothetical-deduc- the unbeliever re.fer their statements to "Reality,"
tive observation. This Kuyper recognizes and capi- (Ito the real order of intelligible facts-in-relation,"
talizes on in his suggestion of the antithetical nature their statements can be abstracted from any system,
of Christian "scjence." This I take it is what Van Til checked and verified and hence asserted as true.
means by epistemological common groW1d. In this Thus the judgment of au unbeliever concerning the distance beao Ibid., p. 159.
ao I bicl., p. 160.
81 Ibid., p. 177.
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Lween ou1· two hypothetical flowers can be considered by itself,
38
HO

Odcbokc, 071. cit., p. 16.
Ibid., p. 17.
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and cvalua.tcd. by inspecting the fact involved. It is possible because its truth and meaning is not derived from an intellectual
system but from i·eality.40

If it seems to some readers that the actual difference between Van Til and Mr. Orlebeke is almost
null, we would remind that reader that similar conch~sions do not always spell out agreement, especially if the reasons buttressing the conclusions strikingly differ. That is, both Van Til and Orlebeke hold to
the ultimate exclusiveness of the system of truth,
both further agree that there is sense in talking about
abstracted "factual" propositions; on the other hand
they radically disagree as to the significance of "abstraction." Van Til insists that any abstracting is
merely rule-of-thumb, limited to the immediate task
at hand. He allows only a practical justification
of the abstraction, namely, that we all have to live
beyond our consciously-formulated explanation of
experience. Mr. Orlebeke is not content with this
"practical abstraction," but wants a guarantee that
any abstracted factual statement can be true apart
from all other considerations and therefore can take
its same place in any system that is factually oriented. He confesses it is hard to see how the ''details"
furnished by non-Christians would be themselves
altered in a Christian system of interpretations, unless one denies the "value" of these details. 41
Perhaps if wc analyze one of the most important
terms of Mr. Orlebeke's analysis we may see the
point more clearly. He speaks of "reality" as that
to which every one must appeal, the common ground
for all, even those in error! How can a man say
anything whether true or false if he does not refer
to reality? Yet on the other hand, he affirms this
reality as somehow given (he does not specify how)
as an order of intelligible facts-in-relations. Further
I 1c feels that each fact comes ready catalogued in
this order of things so that somehow its truth and its
i:icaning are not derived from anyone's interpretati~n, but from reality itself.' ~ I do not want to quarrel
with Mr. Ol'lebeke about the variety of his Realism,
nor indeed even about the adequacy of it, for how
can I judge that except by attributing positions to
Mr. Orlebeke which he does not specify. It is enough
for my purposes merely to point out that "Reality"
is used in the above discussion in at least two ways:
1. "Reality" as the experience which each of
us encounters.
2. Reality as the meaningful pattern by which
we feel this "experience" can be explicated
and organized.
To ask the question: "Indeed, to what else can one
appeal?" jg to think of ''reality" in the first sense.
As yve have seen, it is an artificial interpretation of
either Van Til or Kuyper to think that they do not
appeal to ~'reality of experjence." Even the revelat~on they prize so highly as the impulsion and direcb ve of the Christian system is itself part of the
to Loe. cit.
Ibid., p. 16.
ll>id., p. 17.
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"reality of experience." Mr. Orlebeke is quite right
to assert that every man has to appeal to reality and
certainly will find no one to dispute him. But all of
this is to be sharply contrasted with his other statements which reflect the use of "reality" as a self
conscious accounting of experience. To speak of
"reality as directly given," as a "real order of intelligible facts-in-relation" is to make a significant interpretation which may be criticized and even
contradicted! In fact, even Mr. Orlebeke if he takes
himself seriously cannot agree with the' rest of the
Realists (Aristotle, Alexander), because he insists
that this reality is a real created order of intelligible
facts-in-relation. As a matter of fact, even Dr. Van
Til is a Realist if we wish to continue in this ambiguous way of speaking, for he insists that all the
proofs of Go~, especially the cosmological argument,
are fully valid. Men ought to see God in nature· in
point of fact, however, they do not.' 8
'
If "facts" are really interpretations, it follows that
any "fact" will change in direct proportion as the
total c~aracter ~f the systems in which it alternately
finds itself radically antagonize each other. Take
Mr. Orlebeke's example as a means of clarification.
Two.men .go to a certain blossom to admire its beauty
and in domg so quarrel concerning its classification:
is it a rose or a pansy? Mr. Orlebeke asserts that
this is easily settled by proper reference and in fact
can be settled because both know and agree that it
is a flower blossom. But suppose one of these two
men was from the North Pole, not even having seen
vegetation. Where is the common knowledge of
flower blossom? We need not develop this illustration to the point of absurdity. Even in this less radical opposition of life and world ·viewpoints '\Ve see
that the signifcance of a piece of experience varies
according to the whole interpretation. The point
of Van TH is exactly that we are new creatures, so
also our world and life view is a radical new creation, hence our total view and every related fact
will differ from that of the unregenerate. Pagans
do not need to find disagreement in basic matters
and indeed can appeal to basic interpretations which
stand as "facts" for all of them. The Christian, inasmuch a~ he lacks self-ronscionsness in areas of
life in which he is compelled to live must and does
adopt many interpretations and basic "facts" of the
pagan. Notice carefully however that these agreements arise out of practical compulsions and are not
really acceptable until the Christian in the light of
God's revelation can make adequate justification for
them. It is only because we have not made careful
interpretation that we agree. We can never agree
except with fatal consequence on the basis that we
do not need to make any conscious reorientation.
VI
In conclusion I have two suggestions to make.
First, if we forego the metaphysical allure of terms
rn Van Til, Introduot-ion f,o Systematic Theology, p. 99.
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such as "formal'' and "metaphysical-epistemological"
common ground and adhere to the more simple distinction of theoretical-practical, distinguishing between the consciously-oriented accounting of life's
experiences and the practical process of actual living
which carries us beyond our own accounting, I think
we can save much confusion and misunderstanding.
This in no particular goes beyond Kuyper and Van
Til, but in a measure it may clarify the issue of
common grace. We all have common ground in
the practical outworking of our lives and the abstracted "tools'' which we employ in specific practical tasks. If there is any justification for allowing
this "abstracting" process rather than always viewing everything from its ultimate perspective, it can
only be for purely pragmatic and pedagogical reasons. Thus if we teach arithmetic abstracted from
theory of numbers, it is not that arithmetic does not
need this basic analysis and foundation, but rather
that we all agree to forego such inquiry, to be content
with just such formulation as is needed to expedite
our daily living. We all agree, however, that even
this "abstract arithmetic," if pressed into its conscious theoretical seti:ing, immediately generates distinction indicative of more or less radical disagreement, even within pagan thinking.
The second conclusion I wish to draw concerns
this "borrowing" process which is continually carried on between the Christian and the pagan. In the
figure of Kuyper, we are like Solomon who in order
to build the temple of God must employ the cedars
and stone from Phoenicia. If on the one hand we
emphasize the fact that there are common vocabularies and concepts employed by the two antithetical

positions, \Ve yet are not warranted in arg-uil1g tl1at
this proves dependence, or shows common kinship
in philosophical orientation. For in the process of
"borrowing" the concept has become abstracted,

"sterilized" in order that it may take its place in the
new orientation. That is, if properly utilized such
an abstracted "tool" receives in proportion to the
contrast of the two orientations a place of different
significance and relevance. By way of illustration
one need but look at Ruth Benedict's book, Patte1·ns
of Culture, to see that we cannot merely talk of
marriage, birth or death, etc. as operating in any 01·
all parts of the world; rather is it true that
the only way in which we can know the significance of the selected detail of behaviour is against the backg1·0\md of the motives and emotions and values that are institutionalized in that
cul tu re:1'1

Similarly, such a state of affairs seems to prevail in
all our theoretical endeavor. We all "borrow," but
if we are "worth our salt," the borrowed item is so
metamorphized as to be quite another item. It is in
this sense that we have spoken of a Christian "Realism," "Platonism," "pragmatism," etc., meaning
thereby that the Christian has oriented his theoretical stand in terms of one or another of these manifestations of pagan thinking. Perhaps he has even
employed "conceptual tools" such as "limiting concept," ''fact," "constitutive," etc. The fact remains,
however, that in the measure that he is consistently
a Christian, any of these terms must become so completely reoriented and related as to mean something
quite different for him. Borrowing is bad if this abstracting is incomplete and often means that the
thinker finally is carried by his use of these borrowed concepts into a discarding of his original view·
point.
We may summarize the intent of this article by
rephrasing a clicbe often heard. It is commonly
spoken, "we agree to disagree," but in the light of
the above statements, we can say more accurately,
"we agree in order to disagree."
11

IlPncdict, Ruth, l'atlerns of C11ll1we (New York: 1952),

p. 4fi .

An Inherited Epistemology: I
James Daane
iHERE is a strange reluctance to face the issues of Professor C. Van Til's theology. An
instance of this reluctance can be seen in
Professor L. Berkhof's review of Dr. William
Masselink's General Revelation and Common Grace.
Masselink had expressed concern that important
aspects of Van Til's theology were departures from
Reformed theology. Without facing the issues, Berkhof gave Van Til's theology the seal of his approval,
and stated simply that he did not share Masselink's
concern because Van Til was an old personal friend
and a theologian who had long enjoyed the confidence of the Christian Reformed Church.
The protection enjoyed by a theology favored by
the standards of "orthodoxy by friendship," and
186

"orthodoxy by reputation" is neither of long life nor
wide coverage. The disciple in his own theological
writings brings the true character of the motifs of
such a theology in clear light and thus cuts short
the life of its special protection. The disciple indeed
renders valuable service when he makes explicit the
character of the theology to which he has granted
his discipleship. But alas, he does it without the
protective coverage of such standards of orthodoxy.
Suppose the disciple is not an old friend? Or too
yo.u ng to have ha,d the. confidence of. the Church for
~any year~? ·He is then in the unhappy position of
propagating a theology, without himself enjoying
the special protection enjoyed by the theology he
propagates.
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A case in point is an article by Russell Maatman,
'0n Miracles," in Torch and Trumpet (Aug.-Sept.)
in which the writer applies Van Til's conception of
''fact" and God's will to the subject of miracle and
natural law. His conclusion is that there is no essential difference, so far as the factor of the miraculous
is concerned, between the fact of an atom and the
fact of Christ's healing of the leper, and that the
latter is called a miracle only by 11 general agreement"! He writes, "It is only by general agreement
that of these two events only the healing of the leper
is called a miracle." How did he arrive at this untenable conclusion? From Van Til's position that
God's will is related to every fact ( creational or redemptive, sinful or non-sinful) in precisely the same
manner, Maatma11 draws the conclusion that every
fact is equally miraculous, and that therefore what
the Bible designates as miracle is not more miracle
than the atom. Maatman undoubtedly will not share
the protection enjoyed by the theology he makes
explicit.
Another case in point is Dr. Alexander De Jong's
book The Well-Meant OfJer (The views of H. Hoeksema and K. Schilder). In this book the author, a
one-time student of Van Til, appears as an ardent
exponent of Van Til's theology. Ai almost every
juncture the theological standards employed to evaluate Hoeksema and Schilder are taken over directly
from Van Til.
This explains the otherwise strange fact that although De Jong criticizes a host of theologians besides the two mentioned, he does not express a single
criticism of Van Til, although the latter has stated
his position on the general offer of the gospel much
more explicitly than many whom De Jong does
evaluate. Since the norm of criticism cannot itself
be the object of criticism, Van Til's positions go by
untouched.
But De Jong is already discovering that the protection J;!ranted the theology he champions, is not being
granted to him. In reviews of De Jong's book, both
Dr. H. Kuiper and Rev. H. Hoeksema have accused
De Jong of holding a conception of predestination that
cannot be reconciled with Reformed thought. 1 Yet
neither of them pointed out that De Jung's position
is a direct consequence of his commitment to Van
Til's theology. The truth of this will be shown in the
next article. I wish here only to make the further
observation that if it were not for the general reluctance to face the issues of Van Til's theology, many
more objections would have been registered against
De Jong's book.
1

1 It is strange to see Hoeksema criticize De Joug for applying
Van Til's position to pl'edestination, and on the same page in a
l'eview of my book A Theology of Grace say that he could easily
defend Van Til against my criticisms (Stanrlrord Bewl'e1·, Aug. 1,
1954). And it is even more strange to see both Hoeksoma and
Berkhof-who were at opposite ends of the 1924 common grace
conti·ove1·sy-reveal sympathy for Van Til's common grace theology I This indicates either that both Hoeksema and Berkhof are
giving up their 01·iginal positions, or that 11cithcl' undc1·stands
the issues of Van Til's theology.
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Oe Jong's book reveals that he has all too uncritically accepted many of the characteristic features
of Van Til's theology and epistemology. Although
the cost of his uncritical acceptance appears clearly
in his view of predesination, it appears just as clearly as other basic points in De Jong1s theology.
I do not mean that De Jong never goes beyond
Van Til. At times w1der the impulse of other theological movements, he strikes out far beyond the
borders of Van Til's thought. One striking example
is De Jong's attempt to define the general offer of
gospel proclamation in terms of the eschatological
nature of preaching. Here De Jong is frequently at
his best and he has rendered a real service by insisting that we may not continue to ignore the New Testament teaching concerning the eschatological nature
of gospel preaching, if we would arrive at a better
understanding of the general offer of salvation.
At one point De Jong declares his complete independence of Van Til. While Van Til regards Barth
as one of the most dangerous heretics ever to confront the Chw·ch (Jlm; Karl Barth Become Orthodox?) and designates his theology as the New Modernism, De Jong says about Barth, "His concern is
to fashion a theology of grace" (p. 179). And at
some other points De Jong reveals courage and dar~ng. to strike out on his own power for new theological
insights and formulations. At such points he shows
that he is free from the Roman Catholic conception
of Traditionalism which urges that if Calvin said
something it ought to be accepted and not for improvement. He rightly does not believe that Calvin's
words are necessarily the Wol'd of the Lord. Yet
one could wish that his independent excursions were
tempered by that greater theological care and indc~endencc that comes with greater theological matunty. De Jong's book shows a tendency to accept
almost any theological position, provided he can find
some Reformed writer who can be quoted as support.
Thus De Jong does indeed go beyond the borders
of Van Til's theology. But what he gleans abroad is
brought back as an import. What he gathers as he
goes ahunting in theological lands beyond, is brought
back into the borders of Van Til's theology for naturalization. The result is that De Jong's theology
not only lacks integration, but cannot possibly be
integrated. For what he seeks to naturalize within
the framework of Van Til's theology cannot even
c..:o-exist within the same theological home.

I. De Jong's Evaluation
of Hoeksema 's Epistemology
De Jong's criticism oi Hoeksema and Schilder falls
into two parts: an epistemological and a theological
criticism. This article will be limited to the former
and a second article will be devoted to the latter.'
Both articles will deal chiefly with De Jong's criticism of Hoeksema, for although De Jong shows
greater sympathy for Schilder, the pattern of his
criticism is the same in both instances.
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The late Prof. Heyns, says De Jong, defined the
God-man relationship "in terms of a competitive
polarity,' 1 and Iloeksema made the mistake of accepting this formulation (p. 76). Heyns desired to stress
God's sovereignty in applying, and man's responsibility in appropriating, salvation. This led him, says
De Jong, to posit a competitive relationship between
God and man. De Jong derives this competition
from that "enabling grace" which Heyns said extended to all members of the covenant. Since De
Jong himself regards this enabling grace of Heyns
as an Arminianistic kind of grace (p. 76), one would
think that this would lead to a cooperative rather
than to a competitive relationship.
As will be seen in the next article, it is precisely
this denial of competition in De Jong's conception
of the God-man relationship which calls for serious
scrutiny. De Jong apparently reasons this way:
Heyns' enabling grace enables a man to accept or
reject God, hence there is a situation of competition
between God and man. But this is a confusion of sin
and grace! Grace enables a man to accept-not to
reject. Sin takes care of the latter. Yet as we shall
see in the next article, De Jong, following in the
footsteps of Van Til, denies that sin is a factor in
competition with God's will. In De Jong's conception of competition is the idea that grace (not sin!)
produces a sinful competition between man and
God-an idea identical with and derived from Van
Til's notion that it is the nature of grace to produce
believing elect and sinful reprobate. Thus in his
idea o.f competition we see De Jong falling into Van
Til's error of denying that sin is a competitive factor
antithetical to God's will, on the ground that it is
the very nature of grace to elicit sin as desired by
God's counsel.
Because of this alleged competition which Heyns
is charged with having posited between God and
man, De Jong accuses Heyns of having fallen into
serious epistemological error (p. 77). "Heyns considered it methodologically proper and possible to
abstract himself conceptually from the God-man
relationship in order to explain its dynamic and
reciprocal character by means of logical concepts"
(p. 77).
As indicated above, De Jong deduced the idea
of competition from Ileyns' conception of grace by
means of Van Til's conception of the nature and purpose of grace. Grace produces sin, and sin is not
something that competes with God, for sin is precisely
what God's counsel wills. Therefore, Heyns is said
to make a great mistake both in the realms of method
and epistemology when he thinks that the gracious
offe1 of the gospel is something that we can understan<t by means of "logical concepts." De Jong is
surei.y correct and Heyns very much mistaken if De Jong's idea that grace makes a man a sinful
competitor of Goel, is correct!
What is the nature of Heyns' epistemological error,
according to De Jong? De Jong urges that the gen188

cral offer must be understood in reference to the
dynamic situation created by the eschatological event
o.f gospel proclamation. With this I agree. But I
cannot agree when he urges that it is an epistemological error to attempt to describe this gospel evenL
in which God meets man by means of logical concepts. What concepts should Heyns use, if not logical
concepts? I.f the theologian may not use logical concepts, is theology possible?
The reader may be tempted at this point to say
that since De Jong says that Heyns made a mistake
in using logical concepts, De Jong wants Heyns to
use illogical concepts. For what other kind are
there? But De Jong would answer the reader by
asserting that there is another kind of logical concept. God's kind! And he would warn the reader
that he must not, nay, may not apply the law of noncontradiction at this point and say that God's kind
of logical concept is eithe1· logical or illogical! In
short, De .Jong criticizes Heyns for using "logical
concepts" when he should have used what Van Til
calls a Christian logic.
And if the reader persists that this so-called Christian logic must be either logical or illogical, he will
be accused of not operating with the principle of the
"apparently contradictory," a principle to which,
it is said, the theologian must hold with passion.
And if the reader still persists that such an epistemology is rooted in irrationahsm, and will inevitably
bear the fruit of scepticism, De Jong will deny ii
but his theology will provide the evidence that the
reader is right.
Speaking at one point of a truth distilled from
Scripture, De Jong:s epistemoiogicai irrationalism
and scepticism comes to clear view. He says con·
cerning this scriptural truth, "It is confessed and
not explained, for if it could be explained it would
no longer be confessed" (p. 99). In other words, if
Christian truth would seem logical and reasonable
to us and could therefore be understood and explained by us, then a Christian would not confess it,
for it would not be Christian truth! As will be shown
later, this epistemology insists that it is the nature
o.f Christian truth that it cannot be explained, all
Christian truth must necesscirily appea1· to us to be
illogical and "apparently contradictory."
If it could be understood and explained, then ii
could not be coniessed ! This surely is not the epistemology that underlies the Heidelberg Catechism's
description o.f the faith we confess as a "sure knowledge" Must we confess only what we cannot explain? If we must eschew logical concepts, as De
Jong advises, there will be no faith to confess and no
theologies constructed. De Jong's contrast between
faith and thought is at least as radical as that of
Emil Brunner ( Ch1·istian Doctrine of God, Dogmatics,
Vol. I) which has drawn the fire of orthodox theologians.
TilE CALVIN

FORUM •

•

• APRIL,

195!i

II, The "Qualitative
Epistemological Difference••
Continuing his criticism of Heyns' epistemological
methodology, De Jong declares, "Implicit in his objective-subjective schematism is the .fallacious assumption that human logical predications involve
identical matters when predicated of God's activities
and the creature's activities. . . In his theological
reflection Heyns neglected the obvious fact that
God's offer is an action qualitatively different from
man's offer' (pp. 77, 78).
Here we are at the heart of Van Til's epistemology, which De Jong has taken over bodily.
De Jong w·ges that it is a "fallacious assumption,,
to assume that a divine o[er and a human offer involve the identical matter, namely, an offer. He
urges that it is "obvious" that a divine offer is "qualitatively different'' from a human offer, i.e., qualitatively different from anything we conceive an offer
to be. Therefore, De Jong condemns the "logical
objectivity" of Heyns and Hoeksema. They make
the mistake of assuming that our logical concepts
and theological statements have objective validity,
i.e., are capable of defining and describing the objective event o.f the gospel offer. The truth of the
matter is, urges De Jong, that the objective event
and its tntth are always qualitatively different from
anything we eve1· say or thin1c about them. When
the Bible says "offer," or when God says "offer," what
is meant is something that differs in quality from
anything that man means when he describes this
same objective event as "offer.,, And it was because
Hoeksema and Heyns either forgot, or never knew,
about this ::obvious fact," that they committed a
grave theological error of methodology and epistemology when they abstracted themselves "conceptually from the God-man relationship in order to
explain its dynamic and reciprocal character by
means of logical concepts."

"Christian Logic"
This "obvious fact" was not obvious to Heyns and
Hoeksema. Nor is it likely to be as obvious to most
readers as it is to De Jong. The issue should be
clearly seen. It is not whether our doctrinal formulations are exhaustive expressions of Christian
truths. De Jong did not criticize Heyns for trying
to be exhaustive, but for attempting to explain by
use of "logical concepts" (cf. above). Most of us
would agree that they are not. But most of us would
also contend that if God can reveal himself in the
Bible without violating the law of non-contradiction, and if the Son of God can reveal himself in
human flesh without becoming a rational Paradox
(which De Jong and Van Til admit), then there
would seem to be no reason to deny (as De Jong
and Van Til do) that the Bible and Christ must
appear to us as contradictions and that our doctrinal
expressions of these realities must appear contradicTJIJ<}
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tory because human language and concepts are qualitatively different from the truth they seek to express. There is no reason to believe that the Word
of the Creator must appear to us as a contradiction
when it comes in human flesh or human language
so that it is a serious error to say that our logical
concepts can express God's truth.
The real issue therefore centers on that allegedly
"obvious fact" that our human logic (created and
sanctified by God) is so different in kind from that
divine logic that in.forms God's act and word in the
gospel offer, that the truth of this event is something qualitatively different for God (and thus in
truth) from anything we can say or think about it.
The real issue centers on this diffetence between
divine and human logic.
This divine logic is what Van Til calls Christian
logic. It should be observed, however, that this
divine Christian logic which is qualitatively different
from any human logic, is not the logic of the Christian. As that logic that characterizes God as distinct
from man, it is no more the logic of the Christian
than of the non-Christian. For the Christian no less
than the non-Christian is, and remains, but a man.
The nature of this divine, Christian logic must be
clearly understood, for Van Til frequently violates
his own basic position and speaks of this Christian
logic as something that distinguishes Christian from
non-Christian thinking. He does so whenever he
urges that a Christian can think God's thoughts after
him. But on Van Til's basis this is an inherent im·
possibility. If man's thinking is always qualitatively
different from God's thinking, so that Heyns and
Hoeksema fall into the error of "logical objective"
when they forget the obvious fact that our logical
concepts cannot describe God's thought and truth,
then the Christian, precisely because he is also a man,
can no more think God's thoughts than the unbeliever. The Christian can only do so by becoming God.
Therefore when Van Til urges that this Christian
logic characterizes Christian thinking as distinct
from non-Christian thinking, he is in fact, on his
own basis, confusing God with man. And it is for
this reason that his thinking has recently been criticized as enmeshed in ph1losoph1cal Idealism.
If it is true, as De Jong contends, that the theologian may not - because he cannot without losing
the truth - "abstract himself conceptually" from
the event of gospel offer, then traditional, rational,
theology is an inherent impossibility and all our
traditional knowledge of God is suspect. If, because
our logical concepts are not adapted to the objective
event and truth of the gospel offer, the theologian
may not "abstract himself conceptually" from this
event, but must remain within, existentially within,
this event in order to explain it, then the logic he
must employ is an irrational, non-logical, existential
dialectic. If our logic is divorced from the gospeloffcr event, if reason is divorced from existence, so
189

that our logical concepts are not applicable to events
(in this instance the gospel-offer event) that take
place in our existence, then there is nothing left to
explain such events except an existential, dialectial
logic. It is therefore no accident that Van Til's conception of Christian logic leads him in his actual
theological thought into existentialism. When Reason is theoretically abandoned-even when done in
the interest of a Christian logic-then the practical
and inescapable necessity of thinking rationally will
lead the theologian to accept another type of rationalism, which is in this case Existentialism. Neither
De Jong nor Van Til has yet fully understood that all
theoretical rebellions against Reason and Logic do
in fact employ these very realities to effect their
rebellion. And this last consideration reveals that in
actual practise every such rebellion is only a theoretical game, governed by the rule that the illusion
on which it is based may not be taken seriously.
Proof for this can be seen in Van Til's conception of
the "apparently contradictory," which De .Tong applies to Hoeksema.

III. The Illusion of the
'

1

Apparently Contradictory''

De Jong contends that because Hoeksema (and
Heyns) is seriously in error in his epistemology, he
gets himself involved in logical contradictions and
dilemmas. "Because Hoeksema misconstrue~ the
nature of the God-man relationship he often deals
in terms of logical dilemmas. We mention a few.
The covenant promise and the gospel promise must
be eithe1· conditional or unconditional. The covenant
must be either a means to an end or an end in itself.
The Spirit's ree:eneratinE! activitv is Pither mediate or
v
"
immediate" (p. 79).
De Jong's position is that we must hold - on the
basis o.f the qualitative difference between God's
logic and man's logic - ior example, that regeneration is effected by the Spirit both mediately and
immediately, that the gospel offer is both conditional
<md unconditional. We must be willing to make such
contradictory predications about the same fact. If
Hoeksema, or anyone else, would say that this is
nonsensical (which he does) , he wouJd be warned
by De Jong that he must not impose his human logic
upon the Bible by using the principle of non-contradiction. If Hoeksema would say that it is irrational and nonsensical to insist that the gospel is
both conditional and unconditional (which he does),
he would then be told that this is not really a contradiction, but only an apparent one. It only seems
as-if it were a contradiction. It is really only the
"apparently contradictory" to which a biblical theologian must hold, as Van Til says, with passion. We
must forebear and not apply the law of non-contradiction. To do so, would be to impose our human
logic upon God and his Word.
What must be said about this reJection or suspension of the law of non-contradiction in theology?

First of all, that it rests on an illusion. Here too the
issue must be clearly seen. We will perhaps all
grant that some biblical teachings seem to us to be
contradictory. And we should all grant that the
Bible does not in fact teach contradictions. What
seem to be, only seem to be. Granted. But it should
be clearly seen that we may freely admit alL this,
but that this admission does not in the slightest degree commit us to an acceptance of what is meant
by the "apparently contradicto1·y"! This phrase,
like Van Til's "thinking God's thought after him,"
is a loaded phrase. The distinctive feature of Van
Til's "apparently contradictory" is that it does not
rest on an application of the law of non-contradiction.
And this is an illusion. Neither Van Til nor anyone
else could arrive at, or employ the idea of, the "apparently contradictory" without using the law of
non-contradiction! The concept of the "apparently
contradictory" has not been forged except by use of
the law of non-contradiction. To employ the "apparently contradictory" to the Bible, with the pretense that one does thereby not apply the law of
non-contradiction to the Bible, is only a game in
which the rules forbid that the illusion on which it
is based be taken seriously. The rebellion against
the law of non-contradiction has been only a theoretical exercise, for in actual practise this law has
in fact been employed. The very rebellion rests on
the acceptance of what is (allegedly) rejected. The
rebellion against Reason, itself necessarily employs
Reason. Van Til's rebellion against traditional logic
in favor of his Christian logic, only leads him into
another kind of rationalism and logic-in his case
into an irrational, existential logic.
One can think of apparent contradictions only because one is thinking in terms of contradictions. It
is an illusion therefore to assert that Hoeksema uses
the law of non-contradiction in his theology, but that
De Jong and Van Til do not.

IV. The Arbitrariness of the
"Apparently Contradictory"
It can be expected that a theology built on this
epistemology will present many arbitrary and irrational contradictions. And this is exactly what we
confront in the theologies of De Jong and Van Til.
Thus, for example, Van Til by means of his existential logic can teach that men both exist and do not
exist (Common Grace, p. 72), that the gospel offer
is both meaningful and meaningless, that all men
heard the gospel in Adam, and that millions never
heard it (Particularism and Common Grace, p. 2).
We find the same arbitrariness in De Jong. He
scores Hoeksema for insisting, for example, that
grace is either conditional or unconditional, but with
Van Til he insists that our knowledge of God must
be either exhaustive or non~exhaustive. This indicates that De Jong no less than Hoeksema has done
his thinking in terms of the law of non-contradiction.
1 fiV.
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Yet Hoeksema is scored for doing what both Van
Til and De Jong do when they desire to do it.
We have another example of this arbitrariness in
De Jong's evaluation of Hoeksema. De Jong says,
"Because Heyns neglected this fact [the "obvious
fact" defined above J he was driven to such a logical
contradiction as this: Man accepts the promise of
salvation. Man does not actually accept the promise
offered because God causes him to accept. Thus
man's acceptance is not a real, a genuine acceptance" (p. 78) .
Here the exponent of the "apparently contradictory" presents us with a phoney. This is not even a
seeming contradiction. If God causes me to breathe,
is it a contradiction to say that I breathe?
But De Jong continues, "Hoeksema reacted against
such a logical contradiction. . .With his keen abilities
of logical precision and accuracy Hoeksema addressed himself to the task of clearing away some of the
ambiguities he discovered in Heyns' covenant views.
In this task Hoeksema's reasoning was clear and
consistent. Certainly one could never accuse Hoeksema of not thinking with logical precision" (p. 78).
Thus while De Jong insists that the theologian may
not employ the law of non-contl'adiction in determining Christian truth, he himself applied it to
Heyns' position, and extends high praise to Hoeksema for doing the same.
It is not difficult to account for this wholly arbitrary theological procedure. The epistemological principle of the "apparently contradictory" rests on the
law of non-contradiction. Consequently, De Jong
does not violate his basic position when he applies,
and pr::iises Hoeksem.a for ;:.i.pplying1 the law of noncontradiction to Heyns. But at the same time their
principle of the "apparently contradictory" gives
them the special privilege of denying that anyone
has the right to apply the law of non-contradiction to
their theology. No one has the right to apply this law
to De Jong's position that regeneration takes place
both mediately (through the Word) and immediately
(without the Word). Such a theological contradiction
is protected by the principle of the "apparently contradictory," i.e., that God's truth must always seem
to us to be contradictory. With this the doors are
open for a theological method that is wholly and
purely arbitrary.

V. The ''Apparently Contradictory,'
as Theological Norm
~rhe "apparently contradictory" does not merely
point to the fact that some biblical truths appear to
us as contradictory. On the contrary, the "apparently contradictory" characterizes ali Christian truth.
For the ''apparently contradictory" stems from the
epistemological principle that the truth of God is
always qualitatively different from what it seems
to us, always qualitatively different from anything
we can say or think about it. According to this epis-
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temology, then, all truth rnusl appear to us as contradictory, for all truth is determined and characterized by the God of Christian logic.
If our doctrinal formulations do not appear contradictory, then they are not sound. If they appear
logical, then their very logical nature is proof that
we have violated the law of the "apparently contradictory." A logical doctrinal formulation has
abandoned God's (Christian) logic!
Thus it appears t,hat the proponents of this epistemology do not merely hold with passion to the
"apparently contradictory'' because it is a necessary
device to protect their theological statements from
the claims of logic and rationality. The "apparently
contradictory" has been made into a norm and standard of Christian truth and doctrinal soundness. Since
God's Christian logic informs all truth, all truth must
appear contradictory to us. If it does not, it is not
truth! And this holds true also for the non-theological sciences.

VI. The Absolute Autonomy of
the ''Apparently Contradictory''
What could lend a theologian and his theology a
more absolute autonomy? De Jong's conception of
regeneration as being both mediate and immediate
cannot be touched by any criticism. Any objection is
prohibited by the principle of the "apparently contradictory." All De Jong has to do is say this is biblical truth, and every arrow of criticism is broken
before it is shot, by the claim that it is the nature
of biblical truth to be "apparently contradictory."
With absolute autonomy the "appai·ently contradictory'' is set up as that which is beyond criticism.
In practise the autonomy of the "apparently contr~dic tory" is as absolute as any autonomy claimed
by the autonomous man of secular philosophy. If
we object to a given position because it is contradictory - even contradictory to the Bible! - we are
simply told that it is the nature of biblical truth to
appear to us as contradictory. And for this very
reason it is more dangerous and subtle than thesecular autonomy of the secular thinker, for it comes
in the name of the Lord. It claims that all truth
must appear illogical and irrational because it is
determined by the nature of the God of Christian
logic. Once the claim of this epistemology is granted, there is no defense against its absolute, arbitrary
autonomy.
What has De Jong under the influence of Van Til
actually done through his insistence that our logical
concepts cannot describe the objective truth of God's
words and acts? He has accepted the sceptical and
irrational conclusions of modern secular philosophy,
declared that they are an "obvious fact," and under
the slogan of "Christian logic" asserted that this
sceptical irrationalism actually characterizes the
ratonality of God and of his words and acts. While
the older scepticism could be challenged by pointing
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out that its position that we can be quite sure that
we know nothing for sure is self-contradictory, the
sceptical irrationality of this epistemology cannot
be so challenged, for its principle of the "apparently
contradictory" insists that God's truth must always
appear contradictory. The irrationality of the selfcontradictory has been exalted in the principle of
the "apparently contradictory" as the characteristic
feature of the true rationality of Christian logic.
What was a problem of thought, has now become the
nature of thought, i.e., of Christian thought.
Nor would it help to counter that the truth about
epistemology is - by virtue of the fundamental
principle of this Christian epistemology! - qualitatively different from what the proponents of this
epistemology say it is. They supposedly would
admit that the real truth about epistemology
is qualitatively dillerent from what they have
claimed it to be. But if so, by what right (except
a wholly arbitrary one!) do they press for the acceptance of this epistemology? Surely I am not obliged
to accept something as true, if he who presses it
upon me insists that the truth is really qualitatively
different from what he offers!
This then is that "obvious fact," so revelatory of
the nature of that epistemology which De Jong has
uncritically taken over from Van Til, which De Jong
applies, without any demonstration of its correctness, as a standard of theological evaluation to Heyns,
Prof. L. Berkhof (unlike Van Til, De Jong does not
exempt Berkhof from criticism, p. 167), Hoeksema,
and Schilder.
Without wishing to fall into sarcasm, I can only
wonder why De Jong had to obtain so obvious a fact
from another, and why it took so many centuries for
this "obvious fact" to become obvious to the theological mind of the Church.
I fear it is far more obvious - although not at a
first or second glance-that this alleged qualitative
difference between God's (Christian) logic and man's
logic, together with the wholly arbitrary and autonomous protective device of the "apparently contradictory," is an epistemology resting on a theoretical scepticism which renders all our knowledge
of God suspect.
Not indeed at a first or second glance! For the
epistemology of the "apparently contradictory," together with the theology constructed upon it, is a
highly developed and intricate maze of contradictory
and incompatible elements. It is not a surprise that
De Jong got lost and confused in its labyrinths. But
I would suggest that a good place to begin the process of untangling - and it will take a long critical
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scrutiny · · is with the principle of "sameness with
dif!erence," or "commonality with difference," which
underlies this epistemology.
This principle, which Van Til claims to derive from
the ontological trinity, plays an exceedingly large
role both in this epistemology and in this theology.
How is it that De Jong can say that God's offer and
man's offer, God's knowledge and man's knowledge,
are qualitatively different and therefore do not involve the "identical matter" (p. 77) 1 and yet write
a book about this offer? Because this epistemology
both denies and affirms that God's truth and man's
truth, God's logic and man's logic, God's speech and
man's speech, pertain to the same identical matter.
This is justified by the principle that identity is always identity with a diffe1·ence. This enables De
Jong and Van Til, both in epistemology and theology,
to deny, or affirm, or do both, according as they
desire. Thus De Jong and Van Til can affirm that
our knowledge of God is non-exhaustive, and deny
that it is exhaustive. But they can also affirm that
God's love is qualitatively different from man's love,
and insist that this may not be denied, and yet themselves deny it by insisting that God's love and man's
love are qualitatively similar (p. 78). Or again, De
Jong can insist that the gospel offer is both conditional and unconditional and assert that this "bothand predication" is "wholly unique" (p. 94). This
"both-and predication" corresponds to that which is
"identical and yet different." When the meaning 0£
this latter phrase is understood, most of the difficulties of this epistemology and theology will disappear.
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